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Thanks for taking the time to read this legal notice. Now prepare to enter the wonderful world of military acronyms...

Explanation about publication dates and times

The preview and all the posts which appear below it display a publish date of March 25, and after the preview, each post shows a publish time earlier than the post preceding it. This was done so that the posts would appear in proper reading order. The preview and the outline were first published on March 16, but some revisions were made between then and March 25, which is the date the current versions were published. The current versions of the 11 subsequent sections were all posted on March 25 and 26.

A preview and explanation

In light of the recent media reports about the disagreements among military commanders in the opening weeks of the Iraq war (see Disagreements among military commanders over the war resurface over at Cosmic Wheel), I decided it was time to revisit my work from almost three years ago on Millennium Challenge 02 (MC 02). I began working on the MC 02 material in April 2003 and stopped on May 19, 2003.

That work was intended to be a chapter in a book on the Iraq war, and maybe some day it will be. I began researching and writing on that little topic three weeks before the war started, and by late September 2003, I had approximately 300 pages of material written and footnoted, with material for probably 300 more. I stopped that work in September 2003 to focus on the 2004 Presidential campaign. Some of that previous work has appeared on Cosmic Wheel, but I decided to post the MC 02 material on its own site so it would not clutter up my blog (anyone who has read my blog just might be laughing at that).

I will post the MC 02 material in sections. Unlike the posts on Cosmic Wheel, the posts here might not include hyperlinks for every cited source. I will make an effort to provide some links, but I cannot promise that I will be able to find links for sources that are over three years old. Also, links will not be in the body of the text. Instead, they will be in the endnotes for each section. Speaking of endnotes, I will not start renumbering in each section. All posts are intended to be parts of a single chapter, so the endnotes will keep on running from section to section. This also allows me to make more liberal use of shortened citation forms. ;-)

The next thing I will post is an outline for the material. After that, as soon as I figure out some formatting matters, I will post the sections of the material. I will make some revisions to my previous work, but for the most part, what will be posted here is what I wrote almost three years ago.

Outline

I. Overview

II. Objective of my analysis

III. Initial description

IV. Purpose and objectives

• A. USJFCOM publication prior to MC 02
• B. Gen. Kernan
• C. Some simpler descriptions

V. Definition of terms

• A. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)
• B. Effects Based Operations (EBO)
• C. Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
• D. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
• E. Joint Interagency Coordination Group
• F. All of these terms are related
• G. ...and yet one more term.

VI. Description of war games in general

VII. Publicly-stated rules at the start of MC 02

VIII. How MC 02 actually played out for the OPFOR

IX. How MC 02 played out from USJFCOM's perspective--and some questions and commentary

• A. MC 02 was an experiment and was not free play.
• B. JFCOM's general response to Van Riper
• C. JFCOM's responses to some of Van Riper's specific complaints

1. The sinking and refloating of the naval fleet
2. Chemical and biological weapons
3. Van Riper's means of communication
4. Being ordered to allow landings

X. Did MC 02 validate anything, or was Van Riper right?

• A. Overview
• B. Van Riper's overriding concern
• C. My objective revisited
• D. A review of MC 02's objectives
• E. MC 02's hits

1. Standing Joint Force Headquarters
2. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

• F. Collaborative Information Environment: maybe a hit, maybe a miss
• G. MC 02's misses

1. Effects Based Operations
2. Operational Net Assessment

• H. Summary

XI. Conclusion as to MC 02

I. Overview (revised on 3-16-06)

On August 6, 2004, I said that "I consider the job that Franks did in planning and executing the war itself to be superb--especially in light of the denial of a northern front through Turkey and the adjustments that were made during combat[.] In light of recent revelations (see Disagreements among military commanders over the war resurface), I am rethinking that conclusion to a degree. However, in April of 2003, I felt there were flaws in the military portion of the planning, and I still feel that way.

The biggest problem with the warfighting aspects of the plan was that there was a tremendous amount of information available to the planners before the war started that was ignored. Stated differently, the “surprises” faced by the military should not have been surprises at all, and the military plan could have and should have addressed those factors. This information took different forms: war games, intelligence from the CIA, and information available to the public through a variety of sources. I will begin with an examination of war games.

II. Objective of my analysis

Some of what I am about to say might not make sense right now, but it is necessary to say it so that the reader can have in mind what I am trying to do in discussing in great detail the war game known as Millennium Challenge 02 (MC 02). In some significant ways I feel that MC 02 was a success, meaning that it validated some new concepts and approaches and that it taught many lessons. However, I nonetheless feel that in other significant ways MC 02 was flawed and contributed to what I see as a bad plan for the Iraq war. Taken alone, what happened in MC 02 was not at all bad. However, when MC 02 is viewed in the context of the plan for the Iraq war, serious concerns are revealed, and that is the ultimate purpose of my analysis. Stated differently, if there had not been an invasion of Iraq, and if there was no major military action of that scale in the next two years, harsh criticism of MC 02 would be hard to justify. But there was a war with Iraq, and there can be no doubt that the results of MC 02 played a role in the plan for that war. Thus, what happened in MC 02 is very relevant to showing why the plan was a bad one.

III. Initial description

Millennium Challenge 02 (MC 02) took place from July 24, 2002 to August 15, 2002. [1] The war game was “congressionally directed in the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act to explore critical war fighting challenges at the operational level of war that will confront United States joint military forces in the future.” [2] The exercise was organized and sponsored by the U.S Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). [3]

MC 02 involved 13,500 personnel from all four branches of the armed forces and utilized a combination of live action and computer simulations. [4] It also incorporated elements from U.S. Special Operations Command, most functional and regional commands, and various Department of Defense and federal agencies. [5] The total cost was approximately $250 million. [6]

Descriptions of the scenario for MC 02 differ. In one description, the U.S. Military, known as the “Blue force,” was fighting against the “Red force” in a “fictitious” Persian Gulf country ruled by a megalomaniac dictator. [7] The description from USJFCOM is as follows:

The scenario was...a very de-stabled Middle Eastern nation. It was a puppet government with a very strong, strong rogue commander, very strong, that commanded over half of the country's land mass and had strong loyalties -- religious, ethnic loyalties -- across that nation and region, but did not have the support of the weak government. The weak government had the support of our nation, but we were very concerned about this rogue commander. And the rogue commander husbanded about four or five terrorist groups, international groups. [8]

_____________________________________

1. Joint Force Command, “Millennium Challenge 02."

2. Department of Defense News Release, “U.S. Joint Forces Command Sponsors Millennium Challenge 02,” July 12, 2002.

3. Id.

4. Fred Kaplan, “War Gamed,” Slate, March 28, 2003; Sean D. Naylor, “War Games Rigged?” Army Times, August 16, 2002.

5. Department of Defense News Release, “U.S. Joint Forces Command Sponsors Millennium Challenge 02.”

6. Kaplan, “War Gamed;” Naylor, “War Games Rigged?”

7. Brendan I. Koerner, “How Do the Pentagon's 'War Games' Work?” Slate, September 17, 2002; Julian Borger, “Wake-up call,” The Guardian, September 6, 2002.

8. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Maj. Gen. Dean Cash.

IV. Purpose and objectives

The description of the purposes and objectives of MC 02 came from several sources both before and after the game was completed. Some of those sources and descriptions are set out below. And don't worry--some of the techinical terms will be defined in a separate section.

A. USJFCOM publication prior to MC 02

Here's what USJFCOM said in is publication “Millennium Challenge 02" regarding the objectives of MC 02:

MC02 focuses on how a U.S. explores the military's ability to conduct Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) against a determined adversary.

Other objectives included the following:

Determine the extent to which a joint force is able to implement the principles outlined in Joint Vision 2020 [9] via the RDO concept through:

• Establishing and maintaining information/knowledge superiority
• Setting the conditions for decisive operations
• Assuring access into and through the battle space
• Conducting effects-based operations
• Sustaining itself as it conducts synchronized non-contiguous operations

Develop improved joint training capabilities through experimentation efforts

Develop goals and objectives for future USJFCOM transformation events

Produce recommendations for current doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) in order to more effectively use our current major systems by developing and adapting a new set of principles.

B. Gen. Kernan

Gen. William “Buck” Kernan, the head of USJFCOM, described the goals of MC 02 in a press briefing on July 18, 2002:

Our main intent here in this experiment is to determine the extent to which our forces are able to establish and maintain knowledge superiority, assure access into and throughout the battle space, leverage all national elements of power, and sustain ourselves as we conduct operations against adversaries that may come at us very differently than we have experienced in the past.

MC '02 will test four key concepts, some of which have already been mentioned: effects based operations, operation net assessment, standing joint force headquarters, and the joint interagency coordination group. Each of these contribute to rapid, decisive operations. We are determined to create a joint force that is interoperable, responsive, agile, precise and lethal, fully capitalizing on the information revolution and advanced technologies available today. [10]

(emphasis added). At the same press briefing. Gen. Kernan also said that MC 02 was “the key to military transformation.” [11]

C. Some simpler descriptions

Here's a more concise statement of MC 02's objectives: [T]he experiment’s main purpose was to test a handful of key war-fighting concepts that Joint Forces Command had developed over the last several years.” [12] USJFCOM's publication also provides this clue: “MC 02 is a critical building block of military transformation.” [13] Stated even more simply, MC 02 was about proving the concepts behind RMA.

As USJFCOM said in “Millennium Challenge 02," “Joint experimentation fosters an operational, decision-making culture in the defense of our nation by exploring the threats of tomorrow today. The basic premise is that critical decisions on future military doctrine, organization and technology should be based on solid empirical results.” (emphasis added). Any claim that MC 02 resulted in “solid empirical results” is debatable.
_______________________________________

9. Joint Vision 2020 , published in June 2000 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presents the basic plan for transformation of the armed forces (RMA). This document will be discussed in detail later.

10. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

11. Id.

12. Naylor, “War Games Rigged?”

13. The Joint Forces Command Glossary defines “transformation” as “The creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations - persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”

V. Definition of terms

As promised, here are definitions for some of the key technical terms

A. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

According to the Joint Forces Command Glossary,

Rapid decisive operations is a concept for future operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, C2 [command and control], and operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and reduce the regional adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The US and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated. [14]

USJFCOM has also published this definition:

Rapid Decisive Operations is...a concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy’s ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock...defeating his will and ability to fight. [15]

(emphasis in original).

Also, keep in mind that, as Gen. Kernan said, effects based operations, operation net assessment, standing joint force headquarters, and joint interagency coordination group are all part of RDO.

B. Effects Based Operations (EBO)

The Joint Forces Command Glossary defines “effects-based operations” as

A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. [16]

If that is not clear enough, then try this explanation from Gen. Kernan in a press briefing on September 17, 2002:

Effects-Based Operations is more than just the kinetic application of military power. It's using our full array of -- in the national arsenal. What is it that we as a nation or as an alliance or a coalition can bring to bear against our adversary, kinetically and non-kinetically, to influence things and ideally to prevent it from going kinetic? In order to do that, you had to be able to anticipate, you had to be able to set conditions, you had to be able to in some cases predict what his reactions were going to be to our actions, what counteractions would we create and what could we do it with, from an intergovernmental perspective. [17]

How about one more definition from USJFCOM?

EBO represents a new way of thinking. It is a way to defeat a complex, adaptive enemy by attacking the coherence of his political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems--reducing the whole to less than the sum of its parts. [18]

C. Operational Net Assessment (ONA)

This term is defined by the Joint Forces Command Glossary as

A continuously updated operational support tool that provides a JTF [Joint Task Force] commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-of-systems" analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs decision-makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks that can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific effects on an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives. ONA is a critical enabler for achieving rapid decisive operations. It is an integrated, collaborative product of Department of Defense and other appropriate government and non-government organizations. Its purpose is to identify key links and nodes within the adversary's systems and to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy them and achieve a desired effect or outcome. [19]

The aforementioned September 17, 2002 press briefing included a description of ONA by Gen. Dean Cash. ONA is “an intelligence tool that [is] supposed to allow us to see all, know all.” [20] The ONA as tested in MC 02 fused together the intelligence systems of seven agencies--the four branches of the military plus the CIA, DIA, and NSA. [21] Once such fusion occurs, “then we put the information and present the information in cause-and-effect relationship, so if I do this, then these things will happen. And so you can anticipate and start shaping decisions, potentially start shaping decisions. That's the operational net assessment concept.” [22]

And here is yet another definition courtesy of USJFCOM:

ONA integrates people, processes and tools and consists of three basic elements; multi-faceted sources of information; collaborative analysis and fusion; synthesis and decision. It provides the foundation for a coherent knowledge base that enables effects-based operations. [23]

D. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

According to the Joint Force Command Glossary, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is “Intended to provide each warfighting joint theater CINC with a trained and equipped standing, Joint Command and Control (C2) capability specifically organized to reduce the lag time involved in setting up a JTF headquarters ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations in small-scale contingencies.” [24]

Joint Force Command provides more explanation in a separate document entitled "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element:"

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) is a team of operational planners and information command and control specialists.

This team of planning, operations, information management, and information superiority experts form the backbone of the JTF command structure. During day-to-day operations, the SJFHQ element is assigned to a theater commander and is embedded in the commander's staff.

When a contingency requires the establishment of a joint task force (JTF), all or select portions of the SJFHQ element can be assigned to a theater commander and be embedded in the commander's staff. The team uses collaborative tools to build an extensive knowledge base of focus areas that can be used in the planning process. It also coordinates with academic, industry and government centers of excellence to pull specialized knowledge into the planning process. When a crisis develops in a theater, the SJFHQ can be assigned to a JTF headquarters where it brings the knowledge base, collaborative tools and contacts from the centers of excellence to the JTF. This enables more proactive and coherent advanced planning and quicker use of capabilities than can be accomplished by ad hoc stand up of a JTF headquarters. [25]

E. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

One explanation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group is that “JIACG addresses the widely recognized shortfall in coordinated interagency operational planning activities that has undermined mission success in complex contingencies. It is the harmonizing element behind diplomatic, information, military and economic activities within a region.” [26]

How this group becomes such a “harmonizing element” is described in "Joint Interagency Coordination Group," excerpts from which appear below.

The JIACG concept seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government.

*******

The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

*******

In day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, the group supports the standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) planners by advising on civilian agency operations and plans, and providing perspective on civilian agency approaches, capabilities and limitations to develop a coordinated use of national power.

When a joint task force forms and deploys, the JIACG extends this support to the commander's staff through the JFHQ political-military planning staff. This becomes the mechanism to plan the best mix of capabilities to achieve the desired effects that include the full range of diplomatic, information, and economic interagency activities. [27]

F. All of these terms are related.

RDO is comprised of EBO, ONA, SJFHQ, and the JIACG, and those four elements are closely related. As Gen. Cash explained on September 17, 2002, RDO was first conceived two and a half years before MC 02 when the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the military needed to bring quicker resolutions to conflicts. [28] Initially, it was determined that “One, there was not a military-only solution to get inside the decision loop of the opposing force. And two, you couldn't get there from a cold start.” [29] From these realizations came the concept of the SJFHQ, and from there it was realized that the experts on the SJFHQ “needed a tool because there were all these intelligence stovepipe tools with all these different protocols and rules, well, let's fuse it.” [30] From there, the developmental process went as follows:

Then we needed to have some of the cause and effect relationship with these tools and think differently about conflict resolution, affects base, because if you're going to use other elements of national power besides the military, it's a different set of protocols. That's what started off two years ago, and now has morphed to Effects-Based Operations, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, the Operational New Assessment, the Joint Interagency Control Group[.] [31]

In other words, one concept created a new need which in return required another concept.

A close look at the four elements of RDO shows a common theme which can be called “jointness.” There is a sharing and coordination of intelligence, expertise, and equipment. If there is a breakdown in any one element, it affects the other elements. Any doubt as to this interrelation and interdependence is removed by “JFCOM Post-MC 02,” which says “If a Standing JFHQ, informed by Operational Net Assessment, employs Effects Based Operations, then today's Joint Force can have the decision superiority necessary to enable rapid and decisive operations.” [32]

G. ...and yet one more term.

On the “Frequently Asked Questions” page on the MC 02 website , USJFCOM listed “Common Relevant Operational Picture” (CROP) as a concept to be tested at MC 02 and defined it as follows:

[P]rovides comprehensive situational awareness to make the most informed decisions. CROP is a key element of RDO. This concept provides situational analysis, a collaborative environment and the web portal though which information can be both "pushed and pulled." The goal is to find and present to the joint force commander the best set of relevant information the warfighting commander needs to make good decisions and to act. [33]

The funny thing is that Kernan did not even mention CROP in the July 18, 2002 press briefing, and there was no mention of it at the September 17 press briefing. Also, “JFCOM Post-MC 02" contains no discussion of CROP. This might not be at all important, but I find it strange that a concept that was announced as one of the keys to RDO was not mentioned in anything except this “faq” page.
_______________________________________

14. Originally, this definition for RDO was in the Joint Forces Command Glossary, but I have been unable to find it now.

15. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

16. Originally, this definition for EBO was in the Joint Forces Command Glossary, but I have been unable to find it now.

17. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

18. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

19. Joint Force Command Glossary.

20. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

24. Joint Force Command Glossary.

25. Unites States Joint Force Command, "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element."

26. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

27. Unites States Joint Force Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group."

28. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

29. Id.

30. Id.

31. Id.

32. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

33. United States Joint Force Command, "Frequently Asked Questions."

VI. Description of war games in general

For purposes of this publication, war games can have two identifying characteristics. First, a war game can be either an “exercise” or an “experiment.” Second, a war game can be scripted or “free play.”

An “exercise” uses primarily live forces. [34] The doctrines used by both the Blue force (the U.S. military) and the Opposing Force (OPFOR) are defined. Typically, an exercise is used to assess existing training, readiness, capabilities, and skill sets. [35] Stated differently, an exercise utilizes prescriptive tasks, conditions, and standards in order to measure current doctrine and forces. [36]

An “experiment” “does not focus on things. It does not focus so much on platforms and systems and technology as it does concepts.” [37] It does not examine the present as much as it does what the military envisions for the future. [38] Also, “If you're truly experimenting, you're looking at what's within the realm of the possible, and you don't know until you get into it. If you already know what the after-action report's going to look like on an experiment, you've probably not got an experiment. You've just validated a known concept.” [39]

The differences between an “exercise” and “experiment” are important because after this particular war game, USJFCOM insisted that MC 02 was primarily an experiment.

War games are often scripted, meaning that the Blue force and the OPFOR are required to perform certain attacks or responses. [40] This is done so that equipment and concepts can be tested. [41] However, war games are sometimes “free play,” which means that anything goes. [42]
_________________________________________

34. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

35. Id.

36. Id.

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

40. Koerner, “How Do the Pentagon's 'War Games' Work?”

41. Nicholas D. Kristof, “How We Won the War,” New York Times, September 6, 2002.

42. Koerner, “How Do the Pentagon's 'War Games' Work?”

VII. Publicly-stated rules at the start of MC 02

Prior to MC 02, Gen. Kernan said, “This is free play. The OPFOR has the ability to win here.” [43] Well, Gen. Kernan was right about one thing--the OPFOR certainly had the ability to win. However, the OPFOR was not allowed to win. [44]

In the press briefing on September 17, 2002, USJFCOM went to great lengths to explain that MC 02 was not truly free play and why that was so. That explanation will be discussed in a separate section.
___________________________________________

43. Naylor, “War Games Rigged?”

44. I initially thought there was no difference between “Red force” and OPFOR (Opposing Force). However, in the September 17, 2002 press briefing, Gen. Cash explained that there is a difference between “Red Team” and OPFOR. The Red Team includes civilian as well as military components, whereas the OPFOR is the military force. Because I am focusing on the military component--and the sake of convenience--I will primarily use the term “OPFOR” instead of “Red force” or "Red team" even though use might not be technically correct in some instances. Also, be aware that some the sources quoted herein use the terms "Red force" and "Red team." For purposes of this work, all three of these terms are treated as identifying the opponent in MC 02.

VIII. How MC 02 actually played out for the OPFOR

The OPFOR was led by retired Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper. Van Riper has been a frequent participant in war games and is an expert at playing the leader of the Red force. [45] In contrast to Gen. Kernan's statement about free play, Van Riper said, “Instead of a free-play, two-sided game as the Joint Forces commander advertised it was going to be, it simply became a scripted exercise. They had a predetermined end, and they scripted the exercise to that end.” [46]

In a nutshell, Van Riper used unconventional tactics and was surprising and beating the Blue force. Retired Ambassador Robert Oakley was the OPFOR's civilian leader, and he said Van Riper was out thinking the Blue Force from the first day of the exercise. [47]

Naylor's article from The Army Times described in general the problems Van Riper faced.

Exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue, and on several occasions directed the [Red] Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue. It even ordered him to reveal the location of Red units, [Van Riper] said.

“We were directed … to move air defenses so that the Army and Marine units could successfully land,” he said. “We were simply directed to turn [the air-defense systems] off or move them. … So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be.” [48]

When the game started, Van Riper figured that, in light of the Bush administration's new policy of pre-emption, the Blue force might launch a surprise attack, so he decided that instead he would attack first. [49] As part of his “arsenal” Van Riper had small boats and planes. [50] He had them in and above the Persian Gulf traveling in circles and seeming harmless. [51] Once the Blue naval fleet sailed into the Persian Gulf and demanded that Red surrender or face destruction, Van Riper signaled the small boats and planes to attack. [52] He did so not by using radio transmissions which could have been intercepted by high-tech equipment. Instead, he used coded messages proclaimed through the calls to prayer from the minarets of mosques. [53] Once the signal was given, the boats and planes drove into Blue ships and airfields along the Gulf in suicide attacks. [54] Some of the small boats also launched Chinese Silkworm-type cruise missiles. [55] The Blue fleet did not have time to intercept these attacks, and, as a result, almost all of the fleet--including the only aircraft carrier and two Marine helicopter carriers--was sunk. [56]

At that point, USJFCOM officials stopped the game and refloated the fleet. [57] Van Riper was not pleased: "A phrase I heard over and over was: 'That would never have happened.' And I said 'nobody would have thought that anyone would fly an airliner into the World Trade Center'... but nobody seemed interested." [58]

Next, Van Riper was informed that his microwave communications systems had been neutralized and that he would have to rely on cell phones and satellite phones. [59] Van Riper had other ideas. He wanted to continue to use announcements from the mosques, and he also wanted to utilize motorcycle messengers. [60] In this way, Van Riper would neutralize Blue's ability to intercept electronic communications. Van Riper was instead told he could not do that. As he said, "But they refused to accept that we'd do anything they wouldn't do in the west." [61]

Van Riper also wanted to use chemical weapons, but that request was refused. [62] And then when the OPFOR figured out a way to move its chemical weapons so they could not be found by Blue force, Van Riper was told that he had to hand over the weapons so they could be destroyed. [63]

Hmm....use of chemical weapons was not allowed. Of course, it turned out that the Iraqis did not use any chemical weapons in the war. Could it be that USJFCOM knew at that time that the Iraqis would not use chemical weapons? One has to wonder given the fact that still no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq. This question will be examined further.

Van Riper continued to try to be creative and unorthodox, but then he encountered other problems. Sean Naylor's Army Times article describes what happened:

Van Riper said he became so frustrated during the game that he quit his position as Opposing Force commander halfway through.

He did so, he said, to avoid presenting one of his Opposing Force subordinates with a moral dilemma. That subordinate was retired Army Col. George Utter, a full-time Joint Forces Command employee who, as the Opposing Force chief of staff, was responsible for taking Van Riper’s commands and making them happen in the simulation.

But several days into the exercise, Van Riper realized his orders weren’t being followed.

“I was giving him directions on how I thought the OPFOR ought to perform, and those directions were being countermanded by the exercise director,” Van Riper said. The exercise director was Air Force Brig. Gen. Jim Smith, Utter’s real-life boss at Joint Forces Command.

Matters came to a head July 29. “That morning I’d given my guidance for what was to happen, and I found that [Utter] had assembled the staff and was giving them a different set [of instructions] based on the exercise director’s instructions to him.”

To save Utter from having to choose between following the orders of his commander in the war game and obeying those of Smith, Van Riper stepped down as the Opposing Force commander. However, the retired Marine, who was participating in the exercise on a contract with defense giant TRW, stayed on at the war game as an adviser.

Van Riper said that when he discovered Smith was countermanding his orders July 29, he immediately raised objections with both Smith and retired Army Gen. Gary Luck, a senior adviser to Joint Forces Command who was serving as the Blue Force commander. Van Riper said they told him they would meet with him later that day to discuss the issue, but then failed to follow through. “They never met with me at any time in the exercise,” he said.

So Van Riper said he told his Opposing Force staff that from now on they were to take their orders from Utter, not from him.

Carman said Joint Forces Command had no record of Van Riper having quit as Opposing Force commander. But Van Riper said that in addition to announcing it to his staff, he had made it very clear in a 20-page report he submitted to the command. [64]

In the end, the Blue force vanquished the forces of the evil dictator/rogue commander, and the official word from USJFCOM, via Navy Captain John Carman, was that MC 02 validated all the major concepts. [65] This proclamation will be examined in detail, but before that, let's look more closely at the official responses to Van Riper's complaints.
____________________________________________

45. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

46. Id.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. Borger, "Wake-up call."

50. Borger, "Wake-up call;" Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

51. Id.

52. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

53. Borger, "Wake-up call;" Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

54. Id.

55. Borger, "Wake-up call."

56. Borger, "Wake-up call;" Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

57. Id.

58. Borger, "Wake-up call."

59. Id.

60. Borger, "Wake-up call;" Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

61. Borger, "Wake-up call."

62. Kristof, "How We Won the War."

63. Id.

64. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

65. Id.

IX. How MC 02 played out from USJFCOM's perspective--and some questions and commentary

As mentioned, USJFCOM held a press briefing on September 17, 2002 to explain what had been done and what had been learned from MC 02. That briefing did address Van Riper's complaints. After reading the transcript of this briefing, I was satisfied with many of the statements and explanations made by Generals Kernan and Cash. However, some of the statements and explanations raised other concerns for me and served to highlight Van Riper's ultimate concerns.

A. MC 02 was an experiment and was not free play.

Early in his opening remarks on September 17, 2002, Gen. Kernan said, “And first and foremost, [MC 02] was an experiment.” [66] A major reason for this assertion is the sheer magnitude, complexity, and scope of MC 02. I have already mentioned that MC 02 involved 13,500 troops, live action, computer simulations, and elements from the entire armed forces and various federal agencies, but Kernan provided these additional details:

There were 11 major concepts, 27 joint initiatives, 46 service initiatives and 22 different war-fighting challenges that the combatant commanders and services identified that they wanted to look at during Millennium Challenge. The width, breadth and depth of this thing was enormous. The joint operational area stretched the entire width and depth of the United States. There were nine live locations and 17 simulation locations.

We federated 42 different service modeling and simulation programs into a complex federated system. This gave us the synthetic environment that we needed to do some of the analysis and assessment for Millennium Challenge. [67]

Basically, nothing like MC 02 had ever been done before. Thus, it was also “an experiment in experimenting.” [68]

Judging from the statements of Generals Kernan and Cash, it appears that the primary significance of MC 02 being an experiment rather than an exercise was that the game was in many ways scripted. In other words, MC 02 never was free play. So why did Kernan proclaim the contrary when MC 02 began?

Now, even though I am going to go along with the claim that MC 02 was an experiment, it is worth noting that Kernan also said that MC 02 was “built around an exercise scenario.” [69] So, let's see...it is an experiment, but it is all based on an exercise, but it is meant to test concepts, which makes it an experiment, but it involves 13,500 troops, and that's a primary feature of an exercise...I am getting a case of tired head. Why all this ambiguity? Regardless of whether MC 02 was an experiment or an exercise or both, it is clear that a good deal of the game turned out to be scripted. That in and of itself is not a bad thing. I have already mentioned that scripting is often necessary in order to test equipment and concepts, and, given the size and complexity of MC 02, it is plain that it could not have been free play. As JFCOM deputy commander Vice Admiral Marty Mayer explained:

In anything this size, certain things are scripted, and you have to execute in a certain way, or you’ll never be able to bring it all together...Gen. Van Riper apparently feels he was too constrained. I can only say there were certain parts where he was not constrained, and then there were parts where he was in order to facilitate the conduct of the experiment and certain exercise pieces that were being done. [70]

Gen. Kernan provided a more detailed explanation :

The opposing force is freethinking. It does have the opportunity to act, but it's not unconstrained. Let me tell you, even in an exercise, you cannot have an unconstrained exercise. You are limited by time, you are limited by available assets, you are limited by troops, and there are certain things that you must satisfy.

As you know, operationally when we get involved in something, we are very detailed in how we go about satisfying the crisis, and we will expend every effort to set conditions and ensure that we have the right things in place. And however long it takes, we will take it to satisfy the overall mission, minimize collateral damage and ensure success while saving lives. In an exercise or an experiment, you don't have that luxury. You can't leave this open-ended. There are certain things that you must accomplish, and you're constrained by the time which it takes to do it. So sometimes you interfere a little bit with these things. You do it in experiments -- in exercises; you definitely do it in experiments.

This was further exacerbated by the fact that there were live forces involved. It's a lot easier if you're just dealing with simulation because you can re-cock icons very quickly. Not the same when you have live forces, in particular when, because of the Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom going on, there was a limited period of time in which the services could make certain platforms available to us for the experiment, because they were needed operationally. [71]

Here's what it comes down to: a war game--be it an exercise or experiment--is a game. There are limitations on time and resources. When those limitations are added to the objectives of a particular war game, some degree of scripting is practically inevitable. It is because of these facts that I said the fact that MC 02 was in many ways scripted is not in and of itself a bad thing. Such scripting and the need therefor addresses some of Van Riper's complaints. However, Van Riper's core concerns have not, in my opinion been addressed, and they cannot be explained away with concepts like “experiment” and “scripting.”

In any event, it is clear that 1) MC 02 was considered an “experiment” by JFCOM, and 2) there was a significant amount of “scripting” rather than “free play.”

B. JFCOM's general response to Van Riper

Kernan's basic response to Van Riper was

I will tell you that what he did was he -- I think it goes back to this explanation of an experiment versus an exercise. I think he looked at it more from an exercise perspective.

*******

We were looking at it from an experimental concept perspective. He was looking at it from an exercise perspective. So I think if you -- you know, if you neck it down and look at it just from his perspective, an awful lot of what he had to say was valid. But if you look at it from what we were trying to accomplish in the way of setting conditions to ensure that the right objectives were satisfied, the experimental objectives, it's a much bigger picture, broader picture. [72]

Before proceeding, three points must be made. First, Kernan's statements show why JFCOM went to great lengths to say MC 02 was an experiment rather than an exercise. The second point is that the reliance on the distinction between an experiment and an exercise is of little relevance regarding MC 02 and Van Riper's overriding criticism. MC 02 had significant elements of both an experiment and exercise and nothing like MC 02 had ever been done before. Consequently, MC 02 does not easily fit into either category. Also, as shown in the previous section, Kernan said that scripting and manipulation take place in both experiments and exercises. What I am saying here is that the answers needed about MC 02 do not depend on whether this was an experiment or exercise. The answers depend on whether 1) the scripting and manipulation which occurred were justified and/or unavoidable, and 2) MC 02's objectives were met in light of such scripting and manipulation. The third point relates to Van Riper's core concern. Look at the last sentence in the Kernan quote immediately above. As explained in greater detail later, Van Riper's overriding concern was that MC 02 did not accomplish the “experimental objectives” mentioned by Kernan.

With these points in mind, some of Van Riper's specific complaints will now be addressed.

C. JFCOM's responses to some of Van Riper's specific complaints

• 1. The sinking and refloating of the naval fleet

Recall that Van Riper complained that he was told that the sinking of the fleet “never would have happened.” It appears that Van Riper felt that he was being told that the tactics he used (kamikaze-type attacks by small boats and planes and missiles launched from small boats) never would have happened. However, Kernan and Cash explained why in a real world situation the sinking probably would not have happened.

The primary reason is that, as Kernan explained, in a real military operation the entire fleet most likely would not have been in close to the shore. [73] Typically, the Navy fights over the horizon. This is done for at least two reasons: 1) obviously, it leaves the ships out of range of most fire, and 2) it allows the ships to make full use of their defensive systems without endangering U.S. troops and causing collateral damage. However, the logistical circumstances of MC 02 required a different set up. Part of the live action of MC 02 involved actual naval amphibious vessels. Naval exercises have to be conducted in “prescriptive lanes” because of things like commercial shipping. Due to the way the simulations were set up for MC 02, the fact that the ships were restricted in their activity resulted in all the ships being close in to shore for purposes of the war game. For the Blue force navy, this meant that its ships were more vulnerable to attack, and, more importantly, the ships could not use their defensive systems. Those systems were designed for warfare on the open seas, not for the environment presented in MC 02. When the Blue navy attempted to use those systems in the war game, they began firing on everything in sight--commercial air traffic, commercial shipping, and the Blue force's own troops and ships. Consequently, the navy's defensive systems could not be used, which left it especially vulnerable to attack. Thus, MC 02 presented two very improbable conditions on the navy--being close to shore and inability to use defensive systems. From what I can tell, that is why USJFCOM insisted that the fleet's sinking “never would have happened.”

Another explanation for the sinking of the fleet is based on an anomaly in the war game and how the simulations were set up. [74] As Gen. Cash put it, there were anomalies in the modeling of the simulations which resulted in the commander knowing that Van Riper was planning a preemptive strike but the naval staff being completely unaware of that fact. This anomaly was significant because of what was being tested in MC 02. As Cash explained, this was the first time that intelligence and information from all participating groups (the four branches of the military, CIA, DIA, and NSA) were being were being pooled and made available to all participants. [See V.C. and endnote 21.] The idea was to make this information available to the command staff and test the decision-making at the staff level. While in many ways, MC 02 validated this concept, there was this anomaly in terms of the naval operations, and the staff had no idea what Van Riper was about to do.

The foregoing factors all resulted in Van Riper being able to launch what amounted to a surprise attack on a mostly defenseless fleet that typically would not have been where it was.

The fleet was refloated for a reason that does make sense in the war game context. As Gen. Peter Pace, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “You kill me in the first day and I sit there for the next 13 days doing nothing, or you put me back to life and you get 13 more days' worth of experiment out of me. Which is a better way to do it?" [75] The better way was to refloat the fleet.

All these explanations make sense to me. In the context of a war game in general and MC 02 specifically, I see no problem with the “refloating” of the naval fleet. Even so, it appears that there are lessons that should have been learned from this simulated naval disaster that went unheeded. Van Riper used tactics not anticipated by the Blue Force. He used unconventional, low-tech means to avoid interception of his commands. As Cash asked, “Why didn't the staff anticipate any of those?” [76] The point is that Van Riper used tactics and means that were a surprise--much as the Iraqis did once the war actually started. As will be discussed later, it is disturbing that our military was caught off guard, and one of the reasons is that, because of Van Riper's actions, the military planners should have been aware of the possibility for unusual tactics.

• 2. Chemical and biological weapons

Recall that Van Riper said he was not allowed to use chemical weapons and that he was ordered to turn over his chemical weapons so they could be destroyed.

When Kernan was asked about weapons of mass destruction, he described the scenario for MC 02.

Well, the scenario was not unlike what we're experiencing right now worldwide: that we had an adversary out there that had access to weapons of mass effect. In particular, with the more likely ones, chemical and biological, which are readily available worldwide, he had certain delivery means...He was a rogue commander in a country that basically had lost control of him...His--he had access to some things that were--that threaten us today, without getting into classified areas. So it was a very realistic scenario. That was not his primary use of force, however. His primary use of force was his use of conventional forces. [77]

Notice that Kernan stresses that the “rogue commander's” (Van Riper's) primary use of force was conventional, not chemical or biological, forces. Cash also described the WMD scenario: “In our scenario they had both bio and chemical. I mean, I--we put it in the scenario; we knew that. But the BLUEFOR didn't know where and wasn't sure exactly what types of any of that; they had to work all that out.” [78]

So why was Van Riper precluded from using chemical weapons? Generals Kernan and Cash each gave an answer. Kernan's explanation rested in the nature of war games, but before reproducing his answer, there are other comments by Kernan that are relevant to this issue. When first asked about weapons of mass destruction, Kernan said the following:

Weapons of mass effect, weapons of mass destruction, very much of a concern to us. Obviously, a lot of this is linked to precise intelligence, knowing precisely what's there, what it is that we can target, how can we isolate the area, how can we attack it, how can we minimize collateral damage, what type of weapon systems will we use. [79]

Then Kernan was asked, “But you did not create in the scenario a situation whereby military forces were encountering either unanticipated or even anticipated CW or biological?” His answer was that

Yes, we did. In fact, that's one of the things we've had to ultimately force, to be quite candid. And it's one of the things that'll probably come out -- it was based on limitation on time. We wanted to do certain things and, primarily, once again, not from a tactical perspective but from an operational perspective. We wanted to look at the ability for new intelligence to emerge and force the joint force commander and his component commanders into making a decision that he had to--they had to basically do a raid against something that threatened them. [80]

My interpretation is that USJFCOM wanted to find out about WMD destruction in MC 02 in at least two ways: 1) from an intelligence gathering and utilization perspective, and 2) how commanders could then use that intelligence in an operation which involved WMD. With that in mind, here is Kernan's explanation why Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons:

But like I said, we had 36 hours in which we had those platforms available to us. If you'd have put, say, persistent chemicals on the area in which you were going to employ those forces, we would have waited. We didn't have the luxury of waiting. We didn't have the luxury of waiting for the weather to clear the effects of the chemicals, and we would never subject our troops unwittingly to that environment. We would do everything we could. We'd look for alternate places to go. Well, there's a restriction here in the United States, based on training areas, as to where you can go. There was a restriction as to the amount of time that was available to the platforms. So we basically said he can't do it right now.

If he'd have done it -- once again, we had about 17 days in which we could do this, and that was it, and we didn't have the luxury of being able to stretch it out. [81]

Given the nature of war games, this explanation seems for the most part reasonable. However, I still have some questions. Kernan said “We would never subject our troops unwittingly to that environment.” Well, of course that's the case, but in MC 02, the troops were not actually going to be exposed to chemical weapons. Moreover, if the objective was to test intelligence capabilities, how could those capabilities be tested if Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons? Also, how could any operational tests be done if Van Riper could not use chemical weapons? These questions are relevant because there can be no doubt that MC 02 was a preparation for the invasion of Iraq. Anyone who wants to claim otherwise might as well be called “Baghdad Bob.” [82] It is clear that the Bush Administration was convinced that Iraq had and would use chemical weapons. Why then would the war game which was a prelude to an Iraq war not allow the enemy to use such weapons? Since MC 02 was an experiment, why was the use of chemical weapons not allowed? If the results were bad, couldn't the troops have simply be revived much as the navy fleet was refloated? It is certainly possible that Kernan's explanation that there simply was not enough time is accurate. However, without further explanation, I will continue to have serious doubts.

Cash did provide another explanation,

Well, it really didn't--because they were--they were able to have some success on taking out infrastructure. And we really came to a conclusion of--for this part of the experiment before we really--before any of the weapons of mass effects were ever implemented, because if we'd have--and as General Kernan suggested, the rogue commander had a persona that we created. And that was probably one of the challenges with General Van Riper. He didn't have that same persona. And to use some of the things that he wanted to use made no sense for the persona that we created. We spent some time on this guy to create this persona, because the persona was the difficult part...And we worked at some length to create this persona. So to answer your question specifically, the weapons of mass effects were never implemented, other than when we struck at--the blue forces struck a target. And then once we started developing a lot-- the consequences of collateral damage--"Geez, we don't want that." [83]

So, according to Cash, Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons because 1) much of the OPFOR's WMD infrastructure had been destroyed, and 2) Van Riper's persona did not match that of the “rogue commander.” As for the infrastructure, recall that Van Riper said he had been ordered to turn over his chemical weapons so they could be destroyed. And the persona justification does not pass the smell test, in my opinion. Again, MC 02 was a prelude to an invasion of Iraq (I will provide more of an explanation later), and the Bush administration maintained that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons and means of keeping them hidden. Why then script a scenario wherein those chemical weapons are simply turned over and destroyed? And why was the Blue force unable to find those weapons, thus compelling an order for Van Riper to essentially tell where they were?

I have to concede that perhaps this all was very innocent and on the up and up. Still, the official explanations fall short of convincing me.

• 3. Van Riper's means of communication

Recall that Van Riper was told that “his microwave communications systems had been neutralized and that he would have to rely on cell phones and satellite phones” and that he “wanted to continue to use announcements from the mosques, and he also wanted to utilize motorcycle messengers. In this way, Van Riper would neutralize Blue's ability to intercept electronic communications. Van Riper was instead told he could not do that. As he said, 'But they refused to accept that we'd do anything they wouldn't do in the west.'” [See VIII and endnotes 59-61.]

Kernan and Cash provided no response on this issue. Perhaps such action did not fit the rogue commander's persona. I particularly would like to see any response to Van Riper's claim that “they refused to accept that we'd do anything they wouldn't do in the west.” As discussed later, that seems to be a lesson that was not learned by those responsible for the military plan. What is ironic is that this was a lesson that should have been a part of MC 02. In his July 18, 2002 press briefing, Kernan was discussing the “fusion of intelligence” that would be tested as part of MC 02 when the following exchange took place:

Q: You're talking an awful lot about information. What I'm wondering about is how do you look into the mind of your enemy to anticipate how he might respond to any of a number of different measures that you might take, not what he's done up till now but what he might do at some point in the future?

Kernan: Well, I'd love to be able to answer that, but what it really suggests is that we have got to be more culturally sensitive. We have got to look at what influences our adversary. What is his or her personality like? What are they going to do with information that's provided to them? What are their centers of gravity, personally as well as nationally?

So, yes, this is one of the things we're going to have to look at. We're going to have to look at things culturally. We're going to have to look at things from an institutional perspective. We're going to have to look at does religion affect the way people think, their responses to our actions or actions against us? So I think that's a holistic view of the enemy. [85]

In other words, MC 02 should have tested the U.S. military's ability to anticipate tactics that would not be used by a western country. Yet--judging from Van Riper's comments--this was not done. Why not? It's just a guess, but perhaps the “rogue commander” had a “persona” that was American rather than Arab.

• 4. Being ordered to allow landings

Another of Van Riper's complaints was that he was forced to turn off or move his air defenses so that the Army and Marines could make successful landings on beaches. This again was an issue not addressed by Kernan or Cash in their September 17, 2002 press briefing, but such landings were discussed by Kernan in his press briefing prior to MC 02.

Q: This will be a major test of the Army's Striker Brigade Combat Team?

Kernan: It will.

Q: What are some -- what is the role that's going to play, and what are some lessons you are hoping to learn from that?

Kernan: Well, I think the Army can best speak to--what we are looking at is validating operation--doing operational concepts. And of course, the Services have some very specific objectives that they are looking at. But we will be doing forcible entry. For the Army, for instance, we will be doing an airborne operation followed immediately by the assault landing of the Striker vehicles...So there will be forcible entry. [86]

(emphasis added). How can concepts and platforms regarding forcible entry be tested if the OPFOR is order to stand down and allow landings?
____________________________________________

66. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

67. Id.

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

71. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

72. Id.

73. Id.

74. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

75. Borger, "Wake-up call."

76. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

77. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

78. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

79. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

80. Id.

81. Id.

82. "Baghdad Bob" was the nickname given to the former Iraqi Information Minister who made a never-ending series of untrue and preposterous statements.

83. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash. The Blue force strike mentioned by Cash was described by Kernan as a strike to destroy some of the OPFOR's WMD which resulted in great harm to the surrounding civilian population. Kernan stated that the weaponeer made a decision on what weapons to use that did not take into account all the intelligence and thus was a bad decision.

84. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

85. Id.

X. Did MC 02 validate anything, or was Van Riper right?

A. Overview

As noted earlier, officially MC 02 was a success. The public relations officer for USJFCOM, Navy Capt. John Carman stated that MC 02 validated all the major concepts. Van Riper disagreed. It appears that MC 02 did indeed validate some of the concepts being tested. However, others appear not to have been validated, and that is precisely what disturbed Van Riper.

B. Van Riper's overriding concern

An argument could be made that Van Riper was simply whining because he did not get to do what he wanted. Beside the fact that I doubt that the Marine Corps would permit a whiner to rise to the rank of general, such an argument would be wrong. While Van Riper clearly was irritated by the constraints placed on him, it is equally clear that his complaints reveal a concern for the military and the men and women who serve our country. Van Riper said, “My main concern was we’d see future forces trying to use these things when they’ve never been properly grounded in any sort of an experiment.” [86] In other words, Van Riper was worried that the armed forces would be sent into battle with concepts that had not been truly tested, much less validated.

Also, notice that Van Riper used the word “experiment.” Gee, is it possible that he saw MC 02 as an experiment rather than an exercise?

Van Riper insists he is not opposed to new ideas (such as RDO and EBO), but feels strongly that ideas and concepts must be vigorously tested. He said that he repeatedly told officials

that they should vet new concepts with a process similar to that used in academia, in which “people have to present papers and defend their papers. In the process, good ideas stand the test of the cauldron they’re put in, and come forth, and the ones that aren’t so good get killed off,” Van Riper said. “I haven’t seen anything killed off down there [at Joint Forces Command]. They just keep generating.” [87]

It seems that USJFCOM at least agrees with Van Riper in principal. At the September 17 press briefing Cash described building the opposition in a war game:

Red teaming, from my perspective, as a (sic) experimenter and concept developer -- red-teaming is the person and group of folks that help you attack the concepts. As an experimenter and as a joint concept developer, I want the concept to fail. I work real hard to make it fail. Then we document why it failed and then see if we can now address those failures. If we can't, it goes into the pile of good ideas that just didn't make it. And there's some of those. [88]

It would seem, then, that MC 02--which was an experiment in which the OPFOR was supposed to have the ability to win--was supposed to be a vehicle by which certain concepts would be vigorously tested without an eye to achieving any given result. This is where we get to the crux of Van Riper's complaints, namely that the amount of scripting which occurred as MC 02 unfolded violated the central purpose of the war game. As Van Riper said, “Unfortunately, in my opinion, neither the construct nor the conduct of the exercise allowed for the concepts of rapid decisive operations, effects-based operations, or operational net assessment to be properly assessed…[I]t was in actuality an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue ‘win.’ ” [89] Recall what Gen. Kernan said about “experiments:” “If you already know what the after-action report's going to look like on an experiment, you've probably not got an experiment. You've just validated a known concept.” [90] Van Riper was complaining that he felt that this was exactly what happened in MC 02--with the exception that he felt nothing had been validated.

Van Riper's concerns were pointedly expressed by a retired (and unidentified) colonel who happens to agree with Van Riper: “I don’t have a problem with the ideas,” said the colonel, who declined to be identified. “I do have a problem with the fact that we’re trying to suggest somehow that we’ve validated them, and now it’s time to pay for them. We’re going to buy them — that’s bullshit.” [91]

C. My objective revisited

I am about to discuss what I feel was and was not validated in MC 02. Before doing so, I need to restate my objective in this analysis. I am not trying to prove that MC 02 was a failure. Indeed, in some ways it was successful, and it provided the groundwork for an effective transformation of how the military operates. That is not, however, the same as saying that MC 02 proved concepts and platforms to the extent that could be quickly implemented in the war on Iraq. Also, I am not trying to say that all of the scripting and manipulation done in the course of MC 02 was bad per se.

D. A review of MC 02's objectives

Overall, MC 02 was to test the “military's ability to conduct Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) against a determined adversary.” As defined by Gen. Kernan, RDO is comprised of four basic elements, all of which were being tested in MC 02: effects based operations (EBO), operation net assessment (ONA), standing joint force headquarters, and the joint interagency coordination group.

E. MC 02's hits

When I say that MC 02 was in some ways successful, I am not saying that concepts were absolutely proven to work and/or that MC 02 conclusively established operational parameters. Keep in mind that MC 02 was supposed to test the concepts and validate their worth.

• 1. Standing Joint Force Headquarters

According to Gen. Kernan, the SJFHQ was validated. In fact, it was validated prior to MC 02. USJFCOM had previously been working for eighteen months with the Army 18th Airborne Corps in connection with MC 02. That Corps was to serve as the Joint Force Headquarters for MC 02. Then that Corps was deployed to Afghanistan, meaning that USJFCOM suddenly had to find a new command center for MC 02.. USJFCOM immediately went to the Army's III Corps, sent the SJFHQ to Fort Hood, and together, they were able to accomplish in days what had previously required weeks or months. [92]

On October 30, 2002, JFCOM published “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” Therein, JFCOM concluded that the military should “invest now” in the SJFHQ, and stated that the following insights were gained from MC 02:

• SJFHQ, enabled by collaborative information environment and operational net assessment, significantly reduces the ad-hoc nature of current JTF operations and the physical forward footprint

• SJFHQ brings Combatant Commander’s intent, regional expertise, coherent jointness, and knowledge of the service component headquarters to the JTF headquarters

• SJFHQ personnel provide situational awareness and understanding, especially in the early stages of the crisis to both the Combatant Commander and the JTF commander [93]

I have seen nothing to indicate that the SJFHQ was not validated in MC 02.

• 2. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

Neither Kernan nor Cash gave a detailed description of what was learned about the JIACG, but Kernan did say

There's some more work that needs to be done, but we believe that every combatant commander needs one of these. How successful they will be will be determined based on the level of skill and experience that the interagency sends to the interagency coordination group. We believe these ought to be a permanent group that reside in the CINC's headquarters to provide him that connectivity back to the interagency. [94]

This view was echoed in “JFCOM Post-MC 02,” where it was declared that the military needs to “invest now” in the JIACG. Also, these “Emerging Joint Insights” were listed:

• The JIACG concept contributes to successful rapid decisive military operations

• It strengthens superiority in operational performance among agencies; minimizes disconnects

• It plays a key advisory/planning role in coercive diplomacy, condition setting, access dominance, and post-hostilities transition [95]

(emphasis added). Also, USJFCOM recommended that each Combatant Commander have “a JIACG-like capability...now.” [96]

As of yet, I have been unable to find any detailed discussion of how the JIACG was tested or how it performed in MC 02. Consequently, I have seen nothing to indicate that it was not validated. Also, the concept seems to me to be sound, and I think it is very much needed. Remember that a joint operation war plan has to meet various goals and objectives. There are different, non-military agencies within our government that will help determine those objectives, and those agencies also have expertise regarding those objectives. It makes a lot of sense to somehow be able to utilize such expertise, and the JIACG is designed to do that. Thus, I am going to go along with USJFCOM's position that the JIACG has been validated. My position is not exactly empirical, but that's my story and I'm sticking to it.

F. Collaborative Information Environment: maybe a hit, maybe a miss

The Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) was not identified as one of the major principles being tested at MC 02, but USJFCOM certainly was talking about it afterwards. CIE is defined in the Joint Forces Command Glossary as “The information backbone that provides warfighters the ability to enhance organizational effectiveness and reduce hierarchical, serial planning timelines through information and idea sharing and parallel planning.” The CIE is part of the process of fusing together information and intelligence sources. It appears that CIE is primarily to be used during actual operations. [97] As Cash explained,

This collaborative information environment...let me just mention that to you, how important that is...[W]hat we did is slip our hands in between the command and control seams of each service, the stovepipes, the cubicles that separate the Army from the Air Force from the Navy from the Marine.

*******

This collaborative information environment, we've slipped our arms in between these seams and pushed them to the side. And now there we all are for the first time seeing each other, hearing each other, and I'm communicating with you; I can tell if you're paying attention or not. That was extraordinary. That was extraordinary. And the commander's intent is passed out and shared. And an exchange. We would go--and it's no more than kind of what you do in your e-mail today. We would go and sit and watch staff listen to, in this particularly case, General Bell give his commander's intent. And these would be staff members three and four below in the echelon, the chain of command, listening to the commander's intent being given, real time, and they had a small chat room ongoing of their contemporaries horizontally going and discussing what is being said real time. [98]

Sounds like CIE was a success and a real breakthrough in operational communication. Perhaps that is why USJFCOM recommended on October 30, 2002 that the military “invest now” in CIE. [99] So why am I saying that maybe CIE was a miss? The reason is that the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) was a failure in MC 02, and that issue is discussed two sections below.

G. MC 02's misses

• 1. Effects Based Operations

On September 17, 2002, Kernan said that while he felt Effects Based Operations is a sound concept, “We're not ready to go forward with it yet.” [100]

As of October 30, 2002, the outlook was a bit more optimistic when USJFCOM said that EBO “Needs refinement.” [101] Specifically, USJFCOM articulated the following “emerging joint insights:”

• Effects-based thinking has the potential to become the joint operational concept for the information age

• EBO has the potential to be our future doctrinal centerpiece for planning, executing, and assessing joint military actions [102]

(emphasis added). Saying that something has “potential” is a far cry from saying it is validated.

I would say that the conclusion that EBO needs refinement is an understatement. EBO is supposed to, according to Kernan, anticipate events and in some cases predict what the enemy's reactions will be. How can such a concept be tested if events are being scripted and manipulated? How can this concept be tested if the “enemy” is ordered to reveal the location of weapons and troops, permit his opponent to execute certain actions, not use his weapons, etc.? Recall also that, according to USJFCOM, EBO is supposed to be a way “to defeat a complex, adaptive enemy.” How can that concept be tested when the “enemy” does adapt and then is ordered that such adaptations cannot be used?

It seems to me that MC 02 could not have adequately tested EBO. This is not intended as a crticism. However, if, as a result of MC 02, EBO was then implemented, that is a problem. Given that seven months passed between the end of MC 02 and the start of the war with Iraq, it is possible that the necessary “refinement” of EBO occurred in that time. I have serious doubts about that. Those doubts are grounded in the facts--as will be explained--that the plan for the war failed to anticipate some of the real enemy's actions and reactions.

Before moving on to the next topic, I want to highlight something else Gen. Cash said about EBO. Cash stated that his understanding of EBO had grown in the previous 2 years, and when asked to explain that growth, he began by saying that at the start of that period, he could quantify “things military” in terms of their cause and effect, but that now he understood that EBO included matters other than “things military:”

If I take things diplomatic, take things information, take things economic and try to qualify as well as quantify these instruments of national power into some kind of--and again, a matrix is a bad way to say it, but I don't know how else to explain it here--in sort of a matrix format to allow you to give sort of a cause-and-effect relation in your thinking now--24 months ago, I didn't have this notion of thinking. I had this notion of going to a smart box, submitting my challenge, and walking to the other side of the smart box and here are some courses of action to achieve that.

Today I see that it is much more cerebral. It has much more to do with professional military education, has much more to do with the integration and-- "discourse" is probably the word that I wouldn't use 24 months ago--a lot more discourse between all instruments of national power at the operational level and national level. [103]

This explanation does not really address whether EBO was validated in MC 02, but it does relate back to something that has been previously discussed and will be discussed again. Cash spoke of things diplomatic and economic and the need for integration of all instruments of national power. Recall that according to the military's official doctrine for planning joint operations, the National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of Defense) are responsible for determining the political and strategic objectives and that the military plan must primarily be designed to meet those objectives. Recall also that I am taking the position that the civilians--the President and the Secretary of Defense--are primarily to blame for the overall plan for Iraq.

• 2. Operational Net Assessment

On September 17, 2002, Gen. Cash said in regard to the ONA for MC 02, “Well, obviously, it failed.” [104] Specifically, Cash was referring to the fact that Van Riper's attack on the naval fleet was a surprise to the staff and was successful. [105] So, there's one reason why MC 02 did not validate ONA. Gen. Kernan gave another reason when he said, “I think it's a good idea, but quite honestly, we'd created this operational net assessment.” [106] Or, as Cash said after describing MC 02 as a “huge laboratory,” “Well, if we would rip the ceiling off our lab and the sun would hit it, it would all melt, it would all disappear. It didn't exist anywhere but there.” [107]

Because of that fact, it seems that ONA falls into the same category as EBO--it could not possibly have been truly tested in MC 02.

Okay, let's see...the ONA for MC 02 was entirely scripted, yet still, “obviously, it failed.” That makes me wonder why six weeks after this pronouncement, USJFCOM said that ONA merely “needs refinement.” [108] According to USJFCOM,

• ONA has the potential to become a key enabler of effects-based operations and is complemented by joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)

• ONA process requires refinement in fusing information into actionable knowledge

• To be truly effective, ONA requires extensive interagency participation in its development and enabling technologies [109]

(emphasis added). There's that word “potential” again. Besides the problems with “potential,” Kernan pointed out another problem with ONA when he said that “tools that support that concept are not there yet.” [110]

The failure of the ONA in MC 02 is why I have labeled the Collaborative Information Environment as “maybe a hit.” If your primary intelligence/information tool is not working, then the CIE is not going to have a great impact. Moreover, while the four basic elements are interrelated, the key is information, and the end product from all the information is the ONA. If the ONA is faulty, then the rest of the RDO construct is in real trouble.

And also like EBO, I suppose it is possible that the tools needed to make ONA were developed and implemented in the time between MC 02 and the start of the war. However, again I doubt that happened, because information and intelligence that warned of certain aspects of the war were apparently ignored.

H. Summary

In light of the foregoing, clearly Carman's proclamation that MC 02 validated all the major concepts was wrong. By USJFCOM's own admission, MC 02 showed that EBO was not ready to be implemented and the ONA was a failure. That means that half of the major concepts being tested were not validated. That lends credence to Van Riper's complaints and his overriding concern--that U.S. forces would be sent into battle with concepts that had not withstood the “test of the cauldron.”
________________________________________

86. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

87. Id.

88. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

89. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

90. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

91. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

92. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan. See also http://www.defense-update.com/news/mc02-1.htm.

93. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

94. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

95. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

96. Id.

97. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

98. Id.

99. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

100. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

101. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

102. Id.

103. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

104. Id.

105. Id.

106. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

107. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

108. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

109. Id.

110. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.