V. Definition of terms

As promised, here are definitions for some of the key technical terms

A. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

According to the Joint Forces Command Glossary,

Rapid decisive operations is a concept for future operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, C2 [command and control], and operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and reduce the regional adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The US and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated. [14]

USJFCOM has also published this definition:

Rapid Decisive Operations is...a concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy’s ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock...defeating his will and ability to fight. [15]

(emphasis in original).

Also, keep in mind that, as Gen. Kernan said, effects based operations, operation net assessment, standing joint force headquarters, and joint interagency coordination group are all part of RDO.

B. Effects Based Operations (EBO)

The Joint Forces Command Glossary defines “effects-based operations” as

A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. [16]

If that is not clear enough, then try this explanation from Gen. Kernan in a press briefing on September 17, 2002:

Effects-Based Operations is more than just the kinetic application of military power. It's using our full array of -- in the national arsenal. What is it that we as a nation or as an alliance or a coalition can bring to bear against our adversary, kinetically and non-kinetically, to influence things and ideally to prevent it from going kinetic? In order to do that, you had to be able to anticipate, you had to be able to set conditions, you had to be able to in some cases predict what his reactions were going to be to our actions, what counteractions would we create and what could we do it with, from an intergovernmental perspective. [17]

How about one more definition from USJFCOM?

EBO represents a new way of thinking. It is a way to defeat a complex, adaptive enemy by attacking the coherence of his political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems--reducing the whole to less than the sum of its parts. [18]

C. Operational Net Assessment (ONA)

This term is defined by the Joint Forces Command Glossary as

A continuously updated operational support tool that provides a JTF [Joint Task Force] commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-of-systems" analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs decision-makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks that can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific effects on an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives. ONA is a critical enabler for achieving rapid decisive operations. It is an integrated, collaborative product of Department of Defense and other appropriate government and non-government organizations. Its purpose is to identify key links and nodes within the adversary's systems and to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy them and achieve a desired effect or outcome. [19]

The aforementioned September 17, 2002 press briefing included a description of ONA by Gen. Dean Cash. ONA is “an intelligence tool that [is] supposed to allow us to see all, know all.” [20] The ONA as tested in MC 02 fused together the intelligence systems of seven agencies--the four branches of the military plus the CIA, DIA, and NSA. [21] Once such fusion occurs, “then we put the information and present the information in cause-and-effect relationship, so if I do this, then these things will happen. And so you can anticipate and start shaping decisions, potentially start shaping decisions. That's the operational net assessment concept.” [22]

And here is yet another definition courtesy of USJFCOM:

ONA integrates people, processes and tools and consists of three basic elements; multi-faceted sources of information; collaborative analysis and fusion; synthesis and decision. It provides the foundation for a coherent knowledge base that enables effects-based operations. [23]

D. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

According to the Joint Force Command Glossary, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters is “Intended to provide each warfighting joint theater CINC with a trained and equipped standing, Joint Command and Control (C2) capability specifically organized to reduce the lag time involved in setting up a JTF headquarters ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations in small-scale contingencies.” [24]

Joint Force Command provides more explanation in a separate document entitled "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element:"

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) is a team of operational planners and information command and control specialists.

This team of planning, operations, information management, and information superiority experts form the backbone of the JTF command structure. During day-to-day operations, the SJFHQ element is assigned to a theater commander and is embedded in the commander's staff.

When a contingency requires the establishment of a joint task force (JTF), all or select portions of the SJFHQ element can be assigned to a theater commander and be embedded in the commander's staff. The team uses collaborative tools to build an extensive knowledge base of focus areas that can be used in the planning process. It also coordinates with academic, industry and government centers of excellence to pull specialized knowledge into the planning process. When a crisis develops in a theater, the SJFHQ can be assigned to a JTF headquarters where it brings the knowledge base, collaborative tools and contacts from the centers of excellence to the JTF. This enables more proactive and coherent advanced planning and quicker use of capabilities than can be accomplished by ad hoc stand up of a JTF headquarters. [25]

E. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

One explanation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group is that “JIACG addresses the widely recognized shortfall in coordinated interagency operational planning activities that has undermined mission success in complex contingencies. It is the harmonizing element behind diplomatic, information, military and economic activities within a region.” [26]

How this group becomes such a “harmonizing element” is described in "Joint Interagency Coordination Group," excerpts from which appear below.

The JIACG concept seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government.

*******

The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

*******

In day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, the group supports the standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) planners by advising on civilian agency operations and plans, and providing perspective on civilian agency approaches, capabilities and limitations to develop a coordinated use of national power.

When a joint task force forms and deploys, the JIACG extends this support to the commander's staff through the JFHQ political-military planning staff. This becomes the mechanism to plan the best mix of capabilities to achieve the desired effects that include the full range of diplomatic, information, and economic interagency activities. [27]

F. All of these terms are related.

RDO is comprised of EBO, ONA, SJFHQ, and the JIACG, and those four elements are closely related. As Gen. Cash explained on September 17, 2002, RDO was first conceived two and a half years before MC 02 when the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the military needed to bring quicker resolutions to conflicts. [28] Initially, it was determined that “One, there was not a military-only solution to get inside the decision loop of the opposing force. And two, you couldn't get there from a cold start.” [29] From these realizations came the concept of the SJFHQ, and from there it was realized that the experts on the SJFHQ “needed a tool because there were all these intelligence stovepipe tools with all these different protocols and rules, well, let's fuse it.” [30] From there, the developmental process went as follows:

Then we needed to have some of the cause and effect relationship with these tools and think differently about conflict resolution, affects base, because if you're going to use other elements of national power besides the military, it's a different set of protocols. That's what started off two years ago, and now has morphed to Effects-Based Operations, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, the Operational New Assessment, the Joint Interagency Control Group[.] [31]

In other words, one concept created a new need which in return required another concept.

A close look at the four elements of RDO shows a common theme which can be called “jointness.” There is a sharing and coordination of intelligence, expertise, and equipment. If there is a breakdown in any one element, it affects the other elements. Any doubt as to this interrelation and interdependence is removed by “JFCOM Post-MC 02,” which says “If a Standing JFHQ, informed by Operational Net Assessment, employs Effects Based Operations, then today's Joint Force can have the decision superiority necessary to enable rapid and decisive operations.” [32]

G. ...and yet one more term.

On the “Frequently Asked Questions” page on the MC 02 website , USJFCOM listed “Common Relevant Operational Picture” (CROP) as a concept to be tested at MC 02 and defined it as follows:

[P]rovides comprehensive situational awareness to make the most informed decisions. CROP is a key element of RDO. This concept provides situational analysis, a collaborative environment and the web portal though which information can be both "pushed and pulled." The goal is to find and present to the joint force commander the best set of relevant information the warfighting commander needs to make good decisions and to act. [33]

The funny thing is that Kernan did not even mention CROP in the July 18, 2002 press briefing, and there was no mention of it at the September 17 press briefing. Also, “JFCOM Post-MC 02" contains no discussion of CROP. This might not be at all important, but I find it strange that a concept that was announced as one of the keys to RDO was not mentioned in anything except this “faq” page.
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14. Originally, this definition for RDO was in the Joint Forces Command Glossary, but I have been unable to find it now.

15. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

16. Originally, this definition for EBO was in the Joint Forces Command Glossary, but I have been unable to find it now.

17. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

18. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

19. Joint Force Command Glossary.

20. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

24. Joint Force Command Glossary.

25. Unites States Joint Force Command, "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element."

26. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

27. Unites States Joint Force Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group."

28. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

29. Id.

30. Id.

31. Id.

32. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.”

33. United States Joint Force Command, "Frequently Asked Questions."