XI. Conclusion as to MC 02 (revised slightly on 3-26-06)

In many ways, MC 02 was a remarkable war game. It is impressive that USJFCOM was able to conduct such a massive and complex action. There is no question that MC 02 resulted in successes and valuable lessons. There is also no question that it resulted in failures. There is no question that there was a great deal of scripting and manipulation. In my opinion, some of that scripting and manipulation made it impossible to test EBO and ONA. To that extent, I agree with Van Riper in his complaints about scripting and that concepts not being tested.

However, I cannot conclusively say that MC 02 began with a predetermined outcome. Indeed, I initially concluded that there was not a predetermined outcome, but a case to the contrary can be made (especially due to Van Riper being ordered to turn over weapons, not use certain weapons, and reveal positions once the game started and the constant countermanding of his orders). It seems to me that the scripting and manipulation was made necessary because of the failure of the ONA and the shortcomings of EBO. Certain actions did not have the desired effect because Van Riper was an adaptive enemy, and the breakdown of the ONA resulted in the naval fleet being sunk. Because of those circumstances, if there had been no manipulation by USJFCOM--if the game had been truly “free play”--the game would have been over quickly. If that had happened, other lessons might not have been learned. Also, most of the money spent on MC 02 would have been wasted. On the other hand, if Van Riper had been allowed a free hand and thus defeated the Blue Force, that would have been a huge PR disaster for the military and the Department of Defense. Such a defeat would have been a major blow to the proponents of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs, or transformation). Even so, I initially gave USJFCOM the benefit of the doubt and thought that the outcome was not predetermined. However, the more I thought about it, the more I started leaning toward the opposite conclusion.

Earlier (much earlier) I mentioned “a disturbing pattern of conduct which does not bode well for this nation.” MC 02 was a part of that pattern. For example, a USJFCOM officer said that MC 02 validated all the major concepts when that clearly was not true. At the very least, when he made that statement he should have known that such a conclusion had not been determined. [111] His statement thus sounds a bit like “Iraq has close ties with al Qaeda” and “Iraq has stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.” By the way, as I have documented extensively on Cosmic Wheel, neither of those claims were proven before the war, there was plenty of evidence to the contrary before the war started, and those claims have since been shown to be false. First we were told that there were weapons of mass destruction, then when that did not pan out, we were told that Iraq and al Qaeda were directly linked, and then when that did not pan out, we were told that THE reason for the war was to disarm Saddam of WMD, and then once the war started we were told it was about liberating the Iraqi people. But wait, there's more...We were also told that the occupation and reconstruction would be brief and would not require very many U.S. troops--in spite of the fact that there was a vast amount of information that said otherwise--and now that information has been proved correct. It is the glaring deficiencies in the plan for the aftermath of the war that still absolutely astound me, but I am getting a little bit away from MC 02.

MC 02 is part of this pattern of conduct because we were told one thing and the facts later turned out to be something else. For instance, before MC 02 Kernan said it would be “free play” and clearly things turned out very differently. Then we were told that all the major concepts had been validated when that clearly was not true. Even when Kernan and Cash gave their press briefing and came clean on many things, the overall spin was very positive. Then comes USJFCOM's publication on October 30, 2002, which says that, in spite of an admitted failure, ONA simply “needs refinement.”

Another part of this pattern of conduct is ignoring information and lessons that should be learned. MC 02 showed that the U.S. military needs to think differently--and I'm not talking about how the military operates. For instance, the Collaborative Information Environment was a new way of thinking in that it brought many levels of command together at the same time and allowed input from various sources. Also, the ONA presents a new way of looking at a situation and thus is a new way of thinking. But I am not talking about those things when I say there is a need to think differently. I am talking about what Gen. Kernan mentioned--a need to be culturally sensitive, a need to try to think like the opponent. Van Riper tried many tactics that were unexpected, and one of his major complaints was that USJFCOM would not allow him to do things that would not be done in the west. Western culture and Arab culture are not the same. Van Riper's actions showed a serious need to try to think like an Arab, or at the least realize that there is a need to anticipate tactics that might not be part of established western or military culture. While the military forces on the ground in Iraq for over three years have to a great extent learned and applied this lesson, the Bush administration has not. There were many things stated and explained by Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular prior to the war that were disregarded, and now we have been paying the price ever since.

There is yet another aspect of the pattern of conduct exemplified by MC 02, namely a tendency to force things to happen and fit a predetermined agenda. It is not possible to fully articulate this at this time, but I will say that I feel that almost all of the events leading up to the war were designed to force the war to happen. In other words, contrary to President Bush's statements in his State of the Union Address that “If this nation is forced to war...” it is instead this country that forced the war to happen, and it was forced to happen within a certain timetable. This made me rethink my opinion that MC 02 did not have a predetermined result. Even if MC 02 did not have a predetermined result, I feel that the war and when it happened were predetermined, and everything preceding the war, including MC 02, was designed to meet that predetermined end.

I will at some point discuss in detail evidence that the administration's decision to go to war was made at least one year before the war, if not sooner. Moreover, a case can be made that the war “had” to take place when it did because of how it could affect Bush's bid for reelection. MC 02 had a part in this “Bush push” for war. Recall that I said that “if there had not been an invasion of Iraq, and if there was no major military action of that scale in the next two years, harsh criticism of MC 02 would be hard to justify.” In large part the reason for that lies in something Gen. Cash said on September 17, 2002. He discussed what is apparently still the next major war game for USJFCOM, Olympic Challenge 04:

Olympic Challenge will be prototyping a lot that we are taking out of Millennium Challenge. We're actually going to build it. And now this, we're going to do even--put more demand on it, because we're not only going to build it, we're going to take it out of the lab--because Millennium Challenge was a huge laboratory --and we're going to put it in the field and give it to real people and make them work it. [112]

In other words, MC 02 was supposed to be the first step in experimentation and testing of the major concepts behind RDO. It was not and could not be the be all and end all for these concepts. It was the first test, and it was an “experiment in experimenting.” However, with an impending war on the horizon, MC 02 suddenly became the only test for RDO and its components. Consequently, there was a need for a Blue “win.” At the very least, there could not be a Blue “loss.” That would only raise concerns and inquiries from nosy people like the media and Congress (and how dare they--or anyone else--question this administration, but that topic will be addressed another time), and that could possibly slow down the war preparations. A “loss” also could have been used in any opposition to RMA/transformation, which again could have slowed the war preparations.
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111. Carman, the officer who made the statement (see VIII and endnotes 64-65), was quoted in Sean Naylor's Army Times article, which was published on August 16, 2002. The press briefing by Kernan and Cash took place on September 17, 2002.

112. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.