IX. How MC 02 played out from USJFCOM's perspective--and some questions and commentary

As mentioned, USJFCOM held a press briefing on September 17, 2002 to explain what had been done and what had been learned from MC 02. That briefing did address Van Riper's complaints. After reading the transcript of this briefing, I was satisfied with many of the statements and explanations made by Generals Kernan and Cash. However, some of the statements and explanations raised other concerns for me and served to highlight Van Riper's ultimate concerns.

A. MC 02 was an experiment and was not free play.

Early in his opening remarks on September 17, 2002, Gen. Kernan said, “And first and foremost, [MC 02] was an experiment.” [66] A major reason for this assertion is the sheer magnitude, complexity, and scope of MC 02. I have already mentioned that MC 02 involved 13,500 troops, live action, computer simulations, and elements from the entire armed forces and various federal agencies, but Kernan provided these additional details:

There were 11 major concepts, 27 joint initiatives, 46 service initiatives and 22 different war-fighting challenges that the combatant commanders and services identified that they wanted to look at during Millennium Challenge. The width, breadth and depth of this thing was enormous. The joint operational area stretched the entire width and depth of the United States. There were nine live locations and 17 simulation locations.

We federated 42 different service modeling and simulation programs into a complex federated system. This gave us the synthetic environment that we needed to do some of the analysis and assessment for Millennium Challenge. [67]

Basically, nothing like MC 02 had ever been done before. Thus, it was also “an experiment in experimenting.” [68]

Judging from the statements of Generals Kernan and Cash, it appears that the primary significance of MC 02 being an experiment rather than an exercise was that the game was in many ways scripted. In other words, MC 02 never was free play. So why did Kernan proclaim the contrary when MC 02 began?

Now, even though I am going to go along with the claim that MC 02 was an experiment, it is worth noting that Kernan also said that MC 02 was “built around an exercise scenario.” [69] So, let's see...it is an experiment, but it is all based on an exercise, but it is meant to test concepts, which makes it an experiment, but it involves 13,500 troops, and that's a primary feature of an exercise...I am getting a case of tired head. Why all this ambiguity? Regardless of whether MC 02 was an experiment or an exercise or both, it is clear that a good deal of the game turned out to be scripted. That in and of itself is not a bad thing. I have already mentioned that scripting is often necessary in order to test equipment and concepts, and, given the size and complexity of MC 02, it is plain that it could not have been free play. As JFCOM deputy commander Vice Admiral Marty Mayer explained:

In anything this size, certain things are scripted, and you have to execute in a certain way, or you’ll never be able to bring it all together...Gen. Van Riper apparently feels he was too constrained. I can only say there were certain parts where he was not constrained, and then there were parts where he was in order to facilitate the conduct of the experiment and certain exercise pieces that were being done. [70]

Gen. Kernan provided a more detailed explanation :

The opposing force is freethinking. It does have the opportunity to act, but it's not unconstrained. Let me tell you, even in an exercise, you cannot have an unconstrained exercise. You are limited by time, you are limited by available assets, you are limited by troops, and there are certain things that you must satisfy.

As you know, operationally when we get involved in something, we are very detailed in how we go about satisfying the crisis, and we will expend every effort to set conditions and ensure that we have the right things in place. And however long it takes, we will take it to satisfy the overall mission, minimize collateral damage and ensure success while saving lives. In an exercise or an experiment, you don't have that luxury. You can't leave this open-ended. There are certain things that you must accomplish, and you're constrained by the time which it takes to do it. So sometimes you interfere a little bit with these things. You do it in experiments -- in exercises; you definitely do it in experiments.

This was further exacerbated by the fact that there were live forces involved. It's a lot easier if you're just dealing with simulation because you can re-cock icons very quickly. Not the same when you have live forces, in particular when, because of the Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom going on, there was a limited period of time in which the services could make certain platforms available to us for the experiment, because they were needed operationally. [71]

Here's what it comes down to: a war game--be it an exercise or experiment--is a game. There are limitations on time and resources. When those limitations are added to the objectives of a particular war game, some degree of scripting is practically inevitable. It is because of these facts that I said the fact that MC 02 was in many ways scripted is not in and of itself a bad thing. Such scripting and the need therefor addresses some of Van Riper's complaints. However, Van Riper's core concerns have not, in my opinion been addressed, and they cannot be explained away with concepts like “experiment” and “scripting.”

In any event, it is clear that 1) MC 02 was considered an “experiment” by JFCOM, and 2) there was a significant amount of “scripting” rather than “free play.”

B. JFCOM's general response to Van Riper

Kernan's basic response to Van Riper was

I will tell you that what he did was he -- I think it goes back to this explanation of an experiment versus an exercise. I think he looked at it more from an exercise perspective.

*******

We were looking at it from an experimental concept perspective. He was looking at it from an exercise perspective. So I think if you -- you know, if you neck it down and look at it just from his perspective, an awful lot of what he had to say was valid. But if you look at it from what we were trying to accomplish in the way of setting conditions to ensure that the right objectives were satisfied, the experimental objectives, it's a much bigger picture, broader picture. [72]

Before proceeding, three points must be made. First, Kernan's statements show why JFCOM went to great lengths to say MC 02 was an experiment rather than an exercise. The second point is that the reliance on the distinction between an experiment and an exercise is of little relevance regarding MC 02 and Van Riper's overriding criticism. MC 02 had significant elements of both an experiment and exercise and nothing like MC 02 had ever been done before. Consequently, MC 02 does not easily fit into either category. Also, as shown in the previous section, Kernan said that scripting and manipulation take place in both experiments and exercises. What I am saying here is that the answers needed about MC 02 do not depend on whether this was an experiment or exercise. The answers depend on whether 1) the scripting and manipulation which occurred were justified and/or unavoidable, and 2) MC 02's objectives were met in light of such scripting and manipulation. The third point relates to Van Riper's core concern. Look at the last sentence in the Kernan quote immediately above. As explained in greater detail later, Van Riper's overriding concern was that MC 02 did not accomplish the “experimental objectives” mentioned by Kernan.

With these points in mind, some of Van Riper's specific complaints will now be addressed.

C. JFCOM's responses to some of Van Riper's specific complaints

• 1. The sinking and refloating of the naval fleet

Recall that Van Riper complained that he was told that the sinking of the fleet “never would have happened.” It appears that Van Riper felt that he was being told that the tactics he used (kamikaze-type attacks by small boats and planes and missiles launched from small boats) never would have happened. However, Kernan and Cash explained why in a real world situation the sinking probably would not have happened.

The primary reason is that, as Kernan explained, in a real military operation the entire fleet most likely would not have been in close to the shore. [73] Typically, the Navy fights over the horizon. This is done for at least two reasons: 1) obviously, it leaves the ships out of range of most fire, and 2) it allows the ships to make full use of their defensive systems without endangering U.S. troops and causing collateral damage. However, the logistical circumstances of MC 02 required a different set up. Part of the live action of MC 02 involved actual naval amphibious vessels. Naval exercises have to be conducted in “prescriptive lanes” because of things like commercial shipping. Due to the way the simulations were set up for MC 02, the fact that the ships were restricted in their activity resulted in all the ships being close in to shore for purposes of the war game. For the Blue force navy, this meant that its ships were more vulnerable to attack, and, more importantly, the ships could not use their defensive systems. Those systems were designed for warfare on the open seas, not for the environment presented in MC 02. When the Blue navy attempted to use those systems in the war game, they began firing on everything in sight--commercial air traffic, commercial shipping, and the Blue force's own troops and ships. Consequently, the navy's defensive systems could not be used, which left it especially vulnerable to attack. Thus, MC 02 presented two very improbable conditions on the navy--being close to shore and inability to use defensive systems. From what I can tell, that is why USJFCOM insisted that the fleet's sinking “never would have happened.”

Another explanation for the sinking of the fleet is based on an anomaly in the war game and how the simulations were set up. [74] As Gen. Cash put it, there were anomalies in the modeling of the simulations which resulted in the commander knowing that Van Riper was planning a preemptive strike but the naval staff being completely unaware of that fact. This anomaly was significant because of what was being tested in MC 02. As Cash explained, this was the first time that intelligence and information from all participating groups (the four branches of the military, CIA, DIA, and NSA) were being were being pooled and made available to all participants. [See V.C. and endnote 21.] The idea was to make this information available to the command staff and test the decision-making at the staff level. While in many ways, MC 02 validated this concept, there was this anomaly in terms of the naval operations, and the staff had no idea what Van Riper was about to do.

The foregoing factors all resulted in Van Riper being able to launch what amounted to a surprise attack on a mostly defenseless fleet that typically would not have been where it was.

The fleet was refloated for a reason that does make sense in the war game context. As Gen. Peter Pace, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “You kill me in the first day and I sit there for the next 13 days doing nothing, or you put me back to life and you get 13 more days' worth of experiment out of me. Which is a better way to do it?" [75] The better way was to refloat the fleet.

All these explanations make sense to me. In the context of a war game in general and MC 02 specifically, I see no problem with the “refloating” of the naval fleet. Even so, it appears that there are lessons that should have been learned from this simulated naval disaster that went unheeded. Van Riper used tactics not anticipated by the Blue Force. He used unconventional, low-tech means to avoid interception of his commands. As Cash asked, “Why didn't the staff anticipate any of those?” [76] The point is that Van Riper used tactics and means that were a surprise--much as the Iraqis did once the war actually started. As will be discussed later, it is disturbing that our military was caught off guard, and one of the reasons is that, because of Van Riper's actions, the military planners should have been aware of the possibility for unusual tactics.

• 2. Chemical and biological weapons

Recall that Van Riper said he was not allowed to use chemical weapons and that he was ordered to turn over his chemical weapons so they could be destroyed.

When Kernan was asked about weapons of mass destruction, he described the scenario for MC 02.

Well, the scenario was not unlike what we're experiencing right now worldwide: that we had an adversary out there that had access to weapons of mass effect. In particular, with the more likely ones, chemical and biological, which are readily available worldwide, he had certain delivery means...He was a rogue commander in a country that basically had lost control of him...His--he had access to some things that were--that threaten us today, without getting into classified areas. So it was a very realistic scenario. That was not his primary use of force, however. His primary use of force was his use of conventional forces. [77]

Notice that Kernan stresses that the “rogue commander's” (Van Riper's) primary use of force was conventional, not chemical or biological, forces. Cash also described the WMD scenario: “In our scenario they had both bio and chemical. I mean, I--we put it in the scenario; we knew that. But the BLUEFOR didn't know where and wasn't sure exactly what types of any of that; they had to work all that out.” [78]

So why was Van Riper precluded from using chemical weapons? Generals Kernan and Cash each gave an answer. Kernan's explanation rested in the nature of war games, but before reproducing his answer, there are other comments by Kernan that are relevant to this issue. When first asked about weapons of mass destruction, Kernan said the following:

Weapons of mass effect, weapons of mass destruction, very much of a concern to us. Obviously, a lot of this is linked to precise intelligence, knowing precisely what's there, what it is that we can target, how can we isolate the area, how can we attack it, how can we minimize collateral damage, what type of weapon systems will we use. [79]

Then Kernan was asked, “But you did not create in the scenario a situation whereby military forces were encountering either unanticipated or even anticipated CW or biological?” His answer was that

Yes, we did. In fact, that's one of the things we've had to ultimately force, to be quite candid. And it's one of the things that'll probably come out -- it was based on limitation on time. We wanted to do certain things and, primarily, once again, not from a tactical perspective but from an operational perspective. We wanted to look at the ability for new intelligence to emerge and force the joint force commander and his component commanders into making a decision that he had to--they had to basically do a raid against something that threatened them. [80]

My interpretation is that USJFCOM wanted to find out about WMD destruction in MC 02 in at least two ways: 1) from an intelligence gathering and utilization perspective, and 2) how commanders could then use that intelligence in an operation which involved WMD. With that in mind, here is Kernan's explanation why Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons:

But like I said, we had 36 hours in which we had those platforms available to us. If you'd have put, say, persistent chemicals on the area in which you were going to employ those forces, we would have waited. We didn't have the luxury of waiting. We didn't have the luxury of waiting for the weather to clear the effects of the chemicals, and we would never subject our troops unwittingly to that environment. We would do everything we could. We'd look for alternate places to go. Well, there's a restriction here in the United States, based on training areas, as to where you can go. There was a restriction as to the amount of time that was available to the platforms. So we basically said he can't do it right now.

If he'd have done it -- once again, we had about 17 days in which we could do this, and that was it, and we didn't have the luxury of being able to stretch it out. [81]

Given the nature of war games, this explanation seems for the most part reasonable. However, I still have some questions. Kernan said “We would never subject our troops unwittingly to that environment.” Well, of course that's the case, but in MC 02, the troops were not actually going to be exposed to chemical weapons. Moreover, if the objective was to test intelligence capabilities, how could those capabilities be tested if Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons? Also, how could any operational tests be done if Van Riper could not use chemical weapons? These questions are relevant because there can be no doubt that MC 02 was a preparation for the invasion of Iraq. Anyone who wants to claim otherwise might as well be called “Baghdad Bob.” [82] It is clear that the Bush Administration was convinced that Iraq had and would use chemical weapons. Why then would the war game which was a prelude to an Iraq war not allow the enemy to use such weapons? Since MC 02 was an experiment, why was the use of chemical weapons not allowed? If the results were bad, couldn't the troops have simply be revived much as the navy fleet was refloated? It is certainly possible that Kernan's explanation that there simply was not enough time is accurate. However, without further explanation, I will continue to have serious doubts.

Cash did provide another explanation,

Well, it really didn't--because they were--they were able to have some success on taking out infrastructure. And we really came to a conclusion of--for this part of the experiment before we really--before any of the weapons of mass effects were ever implemented, because if we'd have--and as General Kernan suggested, the rogue commander had a persona that we created. And that was probably one of the challenges with General Van Riper. He didn't have that same persona. And to use some of the things that he wanted to use made no sense for the persona that we created. We spent some time on this guy to create this persona, because the persona was the difficult part...And we worked at some length to create this persona. So to answer your question specifically, the weapons of mass effects were never implemented, other than when we struck at--the blue forces struck a target. And then once we started developing a lot-- the consequences of collateral damage--"Geez, we don't want that." [83]

So, according to Cash, Van Riper was not allowed to use chemical weapons because 1) much of the OPFOR's WMD infrastructure had been destroyed, and 2) Van Riper's persona did not match that of the “rogue commander.” As for the infrastructure, recall that Van Riper said he had been ordered to turn over his chemical weapons so they could be destroyed. And the persona justification does not pass the smell test, in my opinion. Again, MC 02 was a prelude to an invasion of Iraq (I will provide more of an explanation later), and the Bush administration maintained that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons and means of keeping them hidden. Why then script a scenario wherein those chemical weapons are simply turned over and destroyed? And why was the Blue force unable to find those weapons, thus compelling an order for Van Riper to essentially tell where they were?

I have to concede that perhaps this all was very innocent and on the up and up. Still, the official explanations fall short of convincing me.

• 3. Van Riper's means of communication

Recall that Van Riper was told that “his microwave communications systems had been neutralized and that he would have to rely on cell phones and satellite phones” and that he “wanted to continue to use announcements from the mosques, and he also wanted to utilize motorcycle messengers. In this way, Van Riper would neutralize Blue's ability to intercept electronic communications. Van Riper was instead told he could not do that. As he said, 'But they refused to accept that we'd do anything they wouldn't do in the west.'” [See VIII and endnotes 59-61.]

Kernan and Cash provided no response on this issue. Perhaps such action did not fit the rogue commander's persona. I particularly would like to see any response to Van Riper's claim that “they refused to accept that we'd do anything they wouldn't do in the west.” As discussed later, that seems to be a lesson that was not learned by those responsible for the military plan. What is ironic is that this was a lesson that should have been a part of MC 02. In his July 18, 2002 press briefing, Kernan was discussing the “fusion of intelligence” that would be tested as part of MC 02 when the following exchange took place:

Q: You're talking an awful lot about information. What I'm wondering about is how do you look into the mind of your enemy to anticipate how he might respond to any of a number of different measures that you might take, not what he's done up till now but what he might do at some point in the future?

Kernan: Well, I'd love to be able to answer that, but what it really suggests is that we have got to be more culturally sensitive. We have got to look at what influences our adversary. What is his or her personality like? What are they going to do with information that's provided to them? What are their centers of gravity, personally as well as nationally?

So, yes, this is one of the things we're going to have to look at. We're going to have to look at things culturally. We're going to have to look at things from an institutional perspective. We're going to have to look at does religion affect the way people think, their responses to our actions or actions against us? So I think that's a holistic view of the enemy. [85]

In other words, MC 02 should have tested the U.S. military's ability to anticipate tactics that would not be used by a western country. Yet--judging from Van Riper's comments--this was not done. Why not? It's just a guess, but perhaps the “rogue commander” had a “persona” that was American rather than Arab.

• 4. Being ordered to allow landings

Another of Van Riper's complaints was that he was forced to turn off or move his air defenses so that the Army and Marines could make successful landings on beaches. This again was an issue not addressed by Kernan or Cash in their September 17, 2002 press briefing, but such landings were discussed by Kernan in his press briefing prior to MC 02.

Q: This will be a major test of the Army's Striker Brigade Combat Team?

Kernan: It will.

Q: What are some -- what is the role that's going to play, and what are some lessons you are hoping to learn from that?

Kernan: Well, I think the Army can best speak to--what we are looking at is validating operation--doing operational concepts. And of course, the Services have some very specific objectives that they are looking at. But we will be doing forcible entry. For the Army, for instance, we will be doing an airborne operation followed immediately by the assault landing of the Striker vehicles...So there will be forcible entry. [86]

(emphasis added). How can concepts and platforms regarding forcible entry be tested if the OPFOR is order to stand down and allow landings?
____________________________________________

66. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

67. Id.

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

71. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

72. Id.

73. Id.

74. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

75. Borger, "Wake-up call."

76. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

77. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

78. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

79. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

80. Id.

81. Id.

82. "Baghdad Bob" was the nickname given to the former Iraqi Information Minister who made a never-ending series of untrue and preposterous statements.

83. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash. The Blue force strike mentioned by Cash was described by Kernan as a strike to destroy some of the OPFOR's WMD which resulted in great harm to the surrounding civilian population. Kernan stated that the weaponeer made a decision on what weapons to use that did not take into account all the intelligence and thus was a bad decision.

84. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

85. Id.