X. Did MC 02 validate anything, or was Van Riper right?

A. Overview

As noted earlier, officially MC 02 was a success. The public relations officer for USJFCOM, Navy Capt. John Carman stated that MC 02 validated all the major concepts. Van Riper disagreed. It appears that MC 02 did indeed validate some of the concepts being tested. However, others appear not to have been validated, and that is precisely what disturbed Van Riper.

B. Van Riper's overriding concern

An argument could be made that Van Riper was simply whining because he did not get to do what he wanted. Beside the fact that I doubt that the Marine Corps would permit a whiner to rise to the rank of general, such an argument would be wrong. While Van Riper clearly was irritated by the constraints placed on him, it is equally clear that his complaints reveal a concern for the military and the men and women who serve our country. Van Riper said, “My main concern was we’d see future forces trying to use these things when they’ve never been properly grounded in any sort of an experiment.” [86] In other words, Van Riper was worried that the armed forces would be sent into battle with concepts that had not been truly tested, much less validated.

Also, notice that Van Riper used the word “experiment.” Gee, is it possible that he saw MC 02 as an experiment rather than an exercise?

Van Riper insists he is not opposed to new ideas (such as RDO and EBO), but feels strongly that ideas and concepts must be vigorously tested. He said that he repeatedly told officials

that they should vet new concepts with a process similar to that used in academia, in which “people have to present papers and defend their papers. In the process, good ideas stand the test of the cauldron they’re put in, and come forth, and the ones that aren’t so good get killed off,” Van Riper said. “I haven’t seen anything killed off down there [at Joint Forces Command]. They just keep generating.” [87]

It seems that USJFCOM at least agrees with Van Riper in principal. At the September 17 press briefing Cash described building the opposition in a war game:

Red teaming, from my perspective, as a (sic) experimenter and concept developer -- red-teaming is the person and group of folks that help you attack the concepts. As an experimenter and as a joint concept developer, I want the concept to fail. I work real hard to make it fail. Then we document why it failed and then see if we can now address those failures. If we can't, it goes into the pile of good ideas that just didn't make it. And there's some of those. [88]

It would seem, then, that MC 02--which was an experiment in which the OPFOR was supposed to have the ability to win--was supposed to be a vehicle by which certain concepts would be vigorously tested without an eye to achieving any given result. This is where we get to the crux of Van Riper's complaints, namely that the amount of scripting which occurred as MC 02 unfolded violated the central purpose of the war game. As Van Riper said, “Unfortunately, in my opinion, neither the construct nor the conduct of the exercise allowed for the concepts of rapid decisive operations, effects-based operations, or operational net assessment to be properly assessed…[I]t was in actuality an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue ‘win.’ ” [89] Recall what Gen. Kernan said about “experiments:” “If you already know what the after-action report's going to look like on an experiment, you've probably not got an experiment. You've just validated a known concept.” [90] Van Riper was complaining that he felt that this was exactly what happened in MC 02--with the exception that he felt nothing had been validated.

Van Riper's concerns were pointedly expressed by a retired (and unidentified) colonel who happens to agree with Van Riper: “I don’t have a problem with the ideas,” said the colonel, who declined to be identified. “I do have a problem with the fact that we’re trying to suggest somehow that we’ve validated them, and now it’s time to pay for them. We’re going to buy them — that’s bullshit.” [91]

C. My objective revisited

I am about to discuss what I feel was and was not validated in MC 02. Before doing so, I need to restate my objective in this analysis. I am not trying to prove that MC 02 was a failure. Indeed, in some ways it was successful, and it provided the groundwork for an effective transformation of how the military operates. That is not, however, the same as saying that MC 02 proved concepts and platforms to the extent that could be quickly implemented in the war on Iraq. Also, I am not trying to say that all of the scripting and manipulation done in the course of MC 02 was bad per se.

D. A review of MC 02's objectives

Overall, MC 02 was to test the “military's ability to conduct Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) against a determined adversary.” As defined by Gen. Kernan, RDO is comprised of four basic elements, all of which were being tested in MC 02: effects based operations (EBO), operation net assessment (ONA), standing joint force headquarters, and the joint interagency coordination group.

E. MC 02's hits

When I say that MC 02 was in some ways successful, I am not saying that concepts were absolutely proven to work and/or that MC 02 conclusively established operational parameters. Keep in mind that MC 02 was supposed to test the concepts and validate their worth.

• 1. Standing Joint Force Headquarters

According to Gen. Kernan, the SJFHQ was validated. In fact, it was validated prior to MC 02. USJFCOM had previously been working for eighteen months with the Army 18th Airborne Corps in connection with MC 02. That Corps was to serve as the Joint Force Headquarters for MC 02. Then that Corps was deployed to Afghanistan, meaning that USJFCOM suddenly had to find a new command center for MC 02.. USJFCOM immediately went to the Army's III Corps, sent the SJFHQ to Fort Hood, and together, they were able to accomplish in days what had previously required weeks or months. [92]

On October 30, 2002, JFCOM published “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” Therein, JFCOM concluded that the military should “invest now” in the SJFHQ, and stated that the following insights were gained from MC 02:

• SJFHQ, enabled by collaborative information environment and operational net assessment, significantly reduces the ad-hoc nature of current JTF operations and the physical forward footprint

• SJFHQ brings Combatant Commander’s intent, regional expertise, coherent jointness, and knowledge of the service component headquarters to the JTF headquarters

• SJFHQ personnel provide situational awareness and understanding, especially in the early stages of the crisis to both the Combatant Commander and the JTF commander [93]

I have seen nothing to indicate that the SJFHQ was not validated in MC 02.

• 2. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

Neither Kernan nor Cash gave a detailed description of what was learned about the JIACG, but Kernan did say

There's some more work that needs to be done, but we believe that every combatant commander needs one of these. How successful they will be will be determined based on the level of skill and experience that the interagency sends to the interagency coordination group. We believe these ought to be a permanent group that reside in the CINC's headquarters to provide him that connectivity back to the interagency. [94]

This view was echoed in “JFCOM Post-MC 02,” where it was declared that the military needs to “invest now” in the JIACG. Also, these “Emerging Joint Insights” were listed:

• The JIACG concept contributes to successful rapid decisive military operations

• It strengthens superiority in operational performance among agencies; minimizes disconnects

• It plays a key advisory/planning role in coercive diplomacy, condition setting, access dominance, and post-hostilities transition [95]

(emphasis added). Also, USJFCOM recommended that each Combatant Commander have “a JIACG-like capability...now.” [96]

As of yet, I have been unable to find any detailed discussion of how the JIACG was tested or how it performed in MC 02. Consequently, I have seen nothing to indicate that it was not validated. Also, the concept seems to me to be sound, and I think it is very much needed. Remember that a joint operation war plan has to meet various goals and objectives. There are different, non-military agencies within our government that will help determine those objectives, and those agencies also have expertise regarding those objectives. It makes a lot of sense to somehow be able to utilize such expertise, and the JIACG is designed to do that. Thus, I am going to go along with USJFCOM's position that the JIACG has been validated. My position is not exactly empirical, but that's my story and I'm sticking to it.

F. Collaborative Information Environment: maybe a hit, maybe a miss

The Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) was not identified as one of the major principles being tested at MC 02, but USJFCOM certainly was talking about it afterwards. CIE is defined in the Joint Forces Command Glossary as “The information backbone that provides warfighters the ability to enhance organizational effectiveness and reduce hierarchical, serial planning timelines through information and idea sharing and parallel planning.” The CIE is part of the process of fusing together information and intelligence sources. It appears that CIE is primarily to be used during actual operations. [97] As Cash explained,

This collaborative information environment...let me just mention that to you, how important that is...[W]hat we did is slip our hands in between the command and control seams of each service, the stovepipes, the cubicles that separate the Army from the Air Force from the Navy from the Marine.

*******

This collaborative information environment, we've slipped our arms in between these seams and pushed them to the side. And now there we all are for the first time seeing each other, hearing each other, and I'm communicating with you; I can tell if you're paying attention or not. That was extraordinary. That was extraordinary. And the commander's intent is passed out and shared. And an exchange. We would go--and it's no more than kind of what you do in your e-mail today. We would go and sit and watch staff listen to, in this particularly case, General Bell give his commander's intent. And these would be staff members three and four below in the echelon, the chain of command, listening to the commander's intent being given, real time, and they had a small chat room ongoing of their contemporaries horizontally going and discussing what is being said real time. [98]

Sounds like CIE was a success and a real breakthrough in operational communication. Perhaps that is why USJFCOM recommended on October 30, 2002 that the military “invest now” in CIE. [99] So why am I saying that maybe CIE was a miss? The reason is that the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) was a failure in MC 02, and that issue is discussed two sections below.

G. MC 02's misses

• 1. Effects Based Operations

On September 17, 2002, Kernan said that while he felt Effects Based Operations is a sound concept, “We're not ready to go forward with it yet.” [100]

As of October 30, 2002, the outlook was a bit more optimistic when USJFCOM said that EBO “Needs refinement.” [101] Specifically, USJFCOM articulated the following “emerging joint insights:”

• Effects-based thinking has the potential to become the joint operational concept for the information age

• EBO has the potential to be our future doctrinal centerpiece for planning, executing, and assessing joint military actions [102]

(emphasis added). Saying that something has “potential” is a far cry from saying it is validated.

I would say that the conclusion that EBO needs refinement is an understatement. EBO is supposed to, according to Kernan, anticipate events and in some cases predict what the enemy's reactions will be. How can such a concept be tested if events are being scripted and manipulated? How can this concept be tested if the “enemy” is ordered to reveal the location of weapons and troops, permit his opponent to execute certain actions, not use his weapons, etc.? Recall also that, according to USJFCOM, EBO is supposed to be a way “to defeat a complex, adaptive enemy.” How can that concept be tested when the “enemy” does adapt and then is ordered that such adaptations cannot be used?

It seems to me that MC 02 could not have adequately tested EBO. This is not intended as a crticism. However, if, as a result of MC 02, EBO was then implemented, that is a problem. Given that seven months passed between the end of MC 02 and the start of the war with Iraq, it is possible that the necessary “refinement” of EBO occurred in that time. I have serious doubts about that. Those doubts are grounded in the facts--as will be explained--that the plan for the war failed to anticipate some of the real enemy's actions and reactions.

Before moving on to the next topic, I want to highlight something else Gen. Cash said about EBO. Cash stated that his understanding of EBO had grown in the previous 2 years, and when asked to explain that growth, he began by saying that at the start of that period, he could quantify “things military” in terms of their cause and effect, but that now he understood that EBO included matters other than “things military:”

If I take things diplomatic, take things information, take things economic and try to qualify as well as quantify these instruments of national power into some kind of--and again, a matrix is a bad way to say it, but I don't know how else to explain it here--in sort of a matrix format to allow you to give sort of a cause-and-effect relation in your thinking now--24 months ago, I didn't have this notion of thinking. I had this notion of going to a smart box, submitting my challenge, and walking to the other side of the smart box and here are some courses of action to achieve that.

Today I see that it is much more cerebral. It has much more to do with professional military education, has much more to do with the integration and-- "discourse" is probably the word that I wouldn't use 24 months ago--a lot more discourse between all instruments of national power at the operational level and national level. [103]

This explanation does not really address whether EBO was validated in MC 02, but it does relate back to something that has been previously discussed and will be discussed again. Cash spoke of things diplomatic and economic and the need for integration of all instruments of national power. Recall that according to the military's official doctrine for planning joint operations, the National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of Defense) are responsible for determining the political and strategic objectives and that the military plan must primarily be designed to meet those objectives. Recall also that I am taking the position that the civilians--the President and the Secretary of Defense--are primarily to blame for the overall plan for Iraq.

• 2. Operational Net Assessment

On September 17, 2002, Gen. Cash said in regard to the ONA for MC 02, “Well, obviously, it failed.” [104] Specifically, Cash was referring to the fact that Van Riper's attack on the naval fleet was a surprise to the staff and was successful. [105] So, there's one reason why MC 02 did not validate ONA. Gen. Kernan gave another reason when he said, “I think it's a good idea, but quite honestly, we'd created this operational net assessment.” [106] Or, as Cash said after describing MC 02 as a “huge laboratory,” “Well, if we would rip the ceiling off our lab and the sun would hit it, it would all melt, it would all disappear. It didn't exist anywhere but there.” [107]

Because of that fact, it seems that ONA falls into the same category as EBO--it could not possibly have been truly tested in MC 02.

Okay, let's see...the ONA for MC 02 was entirely scripted, yet still, “obviously, it failed.” That makes me wonder why six weeks after this pronouncement, USJFCOM said that ONA merely “needs refinement.” [108] According to USJFCOM,

• ONA has the potential to become a key enabler of effects-based operations and is complemented by joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)

• ONA process requires refinement in fusing information into actionable knowledge

• To be truly effective, ONA requires extensive interagency participation in its development and enabling technologies [109]

(emphasis added). There's that word “potential” again. Besides the problems with “potential,” Kernan pointed out another problem with ONA when he said that “tools that support that concept are not there yet.” [110]

The failure of the ONA in MC 02 is why I have labeled the Collaborative Information Environment as “maybe a hit.” If your primary intelligence/information tool is not working, then the CIE is not going to have a great impact. Moreover, while the four basic elements are interrelated, the key is information, and the end product from all the information is the ONA. If the ONA is faulty, then the rest of the RDO construct is in real trouble.

And also like EBO, I suppose it is possible that the tools needed to make ONA were developed and implemented in the time between MC 02 and the start of the war. However, again I doubt that happened, because information and intelligence that warned of certain aspects of the war were apparently ignored.

H. Summary

In light of the foregoing, clearly Carman's proclamation that MC 02 validated all the major concepts was wrong. By USJFCOM's own admission, MC 02 showed that EBO was not ready to be implemented and the ONA was a failure. That means that half of the major concepts being tested were not validated. That lends credence to Van Riper's complaints and his overriding concern--that U.S. forces would be sent into battle with concepts that had not withstood the “test of the cauldron.”
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86. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

87. Id.

88. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

89. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

90. Special Pentagon briefing on Millennium Challenge 2002, July 18, 2002.

91. Naylor, "War Games Rigged?"

92. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan. See also http://www.defense-update.com/news/mc02-1.htm.

93. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

94. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

95. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

96. Id.

97. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

98. Id.

99. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

100. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

101. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

102. Id.

103. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

104. Id.

105. Id.

106. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.

107. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Cash.

108. United States Joint Force Command, “JFCOM Post-MC 02, Findings and Way Ahead.” October 30, 2002.

109. Id.

110. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned,” September 17, 2002; statement by Gen. Kernan.