I. Overview (revised on 3-16-06)

On August 6, 2004, I said that "I consider the job that Franks did in planning and executing the war itself to be superb--especially in light of the denial of a northern front through Turkey and the adjustments that were made during combat[.] In light of recent revelations (see Disagreements among military commanders over the war resurface), I am rethinking that conclusion to a degree. However, in April of 2003, I felt there were flaws in the military portion of the planning, and I still feel that way.

The biggest problem with the warfighting aspects of the plan was that there was a tremendous amount of information available to the planners before the war started that was ignored. Stated differently, the “surprises” faced by the military should not have been surprises at all, and the military plan could have and should have addressed those factors. This information took different forms: war games, intelligence from the CIA, and information available to the public through a variety of sources. I will begin with an examination of war games.