Outline

I. Overview

II. Objective of my analysis

III. Initial description

IV. Purpose and objectives

• A. USJFCOM publication prior to MC 02
• B. Gen. Kernan
• C. Some simpler descriptions

V. Definition of terms

• A. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)
• B. Effects Based Operations (EBO)
• C. Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
• D. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
• E. Joint Interagency Coordination Group
• F. All of these terms are related
• G. ...and yet one more term.

VI. Description of war games in general

VII. Publicly-stated rules at the start of MC 02

VIII. How MC 02 actually played out for the OPFOR

IX. How MC 02 played out from USJFCOM's perspective--and some questions and commentary

• A. MC 02 was an experiment and was not free play.
• B. JFCOM's general response to Van Riper
• C. JFCOM's responses to some of Van Riper's specific complaints

1. The sinking and refloating of the naval fleet
2. Chemical and biological weapons
3. Van Riper's means of communication
4. Being ordered to allow landings

X. Did MC 02 validate anything, or was Van Riper right?

• A. Overview
• B. Van Riper's overriding concern
• C. My objective revisited
• D. A review of MC 02's objectives
• E. MC 02's hits

1. Standing Joint Force Headquarters
2. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

• F. Collaborative Information Environment: maybe a hit, maybe a miss
• G. MC 02's misses

1. Effects Based Operations
2. Operational Net Assessment

• H. Summary

XI. Conclusion as to MC 02